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"Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech."
-First Amendment to the United States Constitution
"The word 'free' still existed in Newspeak, but it ...
could not be used in its
old sense of 'politically free' or 'intellectually free,' since political and intellectual freedom no longer existed even as concepts."
-G. Orwell, 1984
I.

INTRODUCTION

The year 1984 may not have fulfilled Orwellian prophecies of
governmental totalitarianism, but citizens of the world remain no
less concerned about the quality of their civil liberties. If people
could live peacefully and productively together under a strict caste
system, or blissfully in enslavement, there would be little impetus
to identify "natural rights" nor insistence upon what we know as
"freedom." But human experience has amply demonstrated the
universal yearning for personal liberty, as well as the need to legislate against its deprivation. Thus Big Brother has been the enemy
from long before the Magna Carta and long since the Bill of
Rights.
In America, much of the battle has centered around the freedom
of speech. The traditional justification for viewing the first amendment's guarantee of free speech as virtually absolute-the exceptions are few and narrow in scope-is to encourage an open and
unfettered exchange of ideas. Those thoughts that are abhorrent to
a free society, the argument goes, will wither when aired but fester
if suppressed. Moreover, who is to decide which ideas are abhorrent? Certainly not the government, reasoned the Constitution's
Framers. The interests of the state, and the wisdom of the public
servants elected or employed to run it, may well be inferior in
quality: and motivation, not to mention right, to those of the people. Free speech is so precious and delicate a liberty it must be
preserved at great cost: thus the depth of conviction in Voltaire's
oft-quoted declaration, "I disapprove of what you say but I will
defend to the death your right to say it." '
1. There is some doubt that Voltaire actually uttered those famous words, but they do
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That it is difficult to draw a line between acceptable and nonacceptable expression, however, and hard to allocate responsibility
for deciding what speech should be restricted, is too facile a rationale for justifying a rule of absolute construction. The carefully
drawn exceptions to the rule of free speech are based on logical
demonstrations that there are certain utterances which must be
limited. In recent years there has been growing support for yet another exception: the restriction of speech the very essence of which
is to deny the freedom, dignity, and humanity of an entire class of
people, and the stated goal of which is to destructively attack a
target group by stimulating hatred and/or fear in others-in short;
racial defamation.'
Can such an exception pass constitutional muster? With this
question in mind, comparison of the civil liberties of nations which
consider themselves "free" is enlightening. Sweden, for example, is
a democratic country with laws that prohibit racial defamation.
This article examines group libel in the context of civil liberties; in
the process it compares the likely Swedish response to a hypothetically proposed Nazi demonstration on the streets of Stockholm
with what did happen in Skokie, Illinois in the late 1970's. Conclusions are drawn as to the moral, social, and practical value of 1984vintage anti-defamation laws which permit-nay, encourage-Big
Brother to butt in and regulate that form of speech.
II.

COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES: THE UNITED
STATES AND SWEDEN

The fundamental freedoms sought to be protected by both the
Framers of the American Constitution and those who created Sweden's governmental system are substantially the same. The means
used to achieve and preserve them, however, are differreflect an attitude attributed to him by S.G. Tallentyre (E. Beatrice Hall), an English
writer, in her book THE FRINDS OF VOLTAIRE (1906), at 199. See B. STEVENSON, TIE HoME
BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (1956), at 726, 2276. For judicial use of the quote, see, e.g., People v.
Kieran, 6 Misc. 2d 245, 265, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 291, 307 (1940). See also infra notes 128-49 and
accompanying text.
2. Making racial defamation an actionable tort, whether under the rubric of intentional infliction of emotional distress or otherwise, has been the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That Wound," 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1983); Delgado, Professor
Delgado Replies, 18 HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 593 (1983). The discussion, however, too often
takes for granted the constitutional validity of tort liability. This article seeks to address
more thoroughly (and to overcome) the first-amendment difficulties involved.
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ent-especially schema for protection of civil liberties. Both countries have a written exposition of rights that their governments are
required to observe. In the United States, such liberties are protected primarily by an independent judiciary. In Sweden, while the
courts are independent, protection of civil liberties derives primarily from the restraint and responsiveness exercised by the Riksdag
(Parliament).
A.

Structural Differences and Similarities

Although their approaches are decidedly different, both the
Swedish and American systems seek to implement similar principles of representative democracy and equality before the law.3 The
Constitution of the United States is a statement of fundamental
values, specific provisions of which are construed in contemporary
contexts by the federal courts. Swedish constitutional documents
spell out rules for the implementation of basic values with great
particularity.4 In Sweden, rights and liberties are protected by
"fundamental law"-a category which embraces not only the "Instrument of Government" (Sweden's constitution), but also the
Riksdag Act and the Freedom of the Press Act.5 These laws and
the American Constitution share the characteristic of fundamental
supremacy: each government remains bound by their provisions
until the completion of a specific amendment process, which itself
is designed to insure the participation (or at least approval) of the
populace. Swedish fundamental laws can be altered only by two
successive acts of the Riksdag separated by an intervening election.6 The United States Constitution can be amended only
through a cumbersome process which requires concurrence of twothirds of the legislators in each house and the approval of threefourths of the state legislatures.7
3.

Sweden's fundamental values are stated in its Instrument of Government at 1:1, 1:2,

and 1:8. Article I of the United States Constitution manifests the value of representative
democracy. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRus. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 63 et seq.
(1980).
4. The prior Swedish Constitution was as general as the current United States Constitution. The drafters of Sweden's new Instrument of Government, enacted in January, 1975
[hereinafter IG], could look at two centuries of democracy and jurisprudence in the U.S. as
a model of sorts for what fails and what succeeds. Moreover, the political climate surrounding ratification was not nearly so volatile in contemporary Sweden as was that of the United
States in 1787. Thus the document itself could afford to be more specific. See H. DAiLIus,
HuMAN RIGHTS IN SWEDEN 10 (1981).

5.
6.

IG 1:2.
IG 8:15.

7.

U.S. CONsT. art. V.
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Other differences serve as well to reinforce similarities. In Sweden's form of representative democracy, members of the Riksdag
are elected by popular vote. 8 The prime minister (usually head of
the party that commands a majority of seats) is responsible for the
administrative/executive arm of the government; 9 both he and his
government can be removed at any time by a simple majority vote
of Riksdag members.1 0
Another structural difference between the systems is their means
of access to constitutional review. In the United States, an unconstitutional action may not be reviewed by the courts unless and
until a plaintiff has "standing" to bring suit; on occasion a legitimate grievance is dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff's
complaint is shared by so many others that it is too diluted to
serve as the basis of a lawsuit." In Sweden there is a carefully
structured system of ombudsmen, all of whom have standing to
bring any court process.12 Their duties are to investigate citizen
complaints and take appropriate action, ranging from dismissal of
the complaint to admonitions, reprimands, and institution of legal
proceedings and recommendation of legislative action-in many
senses protecting civil liberties against government encroachment.' s
In the United States judges may enforce only those laws that are
4
consistent with the Constitution, both facially and as applied.1 If
the Supreme Court finds that a law is unconstitutional, lower
courts are bound by that decision and the law is no longer
8. IG 3:1.
9. IG 62-64.
10. IG 6:5. Should this happen, however, the prime minister can require that a new
election be held before his dismissal becomes effective. IG 3:4.
11. The doctrine of standing ostensibly developed in order to streamline the activities
of federal courts. It has been criticized as an easy escape for a judge who is personally hostile to the merits of a case. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Compare Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
12. IG 12:6 provides that ombudsmen shall be elected by the Riksdag, and empowers
them to institute court actions and to obtain information from any public agency or court.
The institution of the ombudsman is described in detail in The Swedish Ombudsmen
(Swedish Institute 1981). See also U. LUNDVIK, THE SWEDISH PARLIAMENTAY OMBUDSMEN
(1982); [annual English-language] REPORT OF THE SWEDISH PARLLMENrARY OMBUDSMEN
(Swedish Government Publication).
13. The office of the ombudsman has cast the differences between the two systems'
processes of judicial review in an important light. See supra note 12.
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803). To do otherwise is always reversible error.
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enforced."5 Thus court decisions in the United States often have
the effect of legislation.
In Sweden, the effect that courts can have is more limited. The
Instrument of Government does not affirmatively provide for judicial review, although it does prevent decisions of the country's
highest courts from being reversed by the Riksdag. 6 The Supreme
Judicial Court first asserted its prerogative of judicial review in
1964.17 The Riksdag, of course, may alter the substantive law in
any manner that does not conflict with the IG (so long as the
change is prospective only in its effect). Application of the laws,
however, is an exclusive function of the judiciary: "No authority
. . .may determine . . . how a court shall adjudicate a particular
case . . . ."I In this respect Swedish judicial review is similar to

that in the United States-both are based upon principles of judicial independence and the fundamental nature of a written
constitution. 9
Swedish judicial decisions, however, have little of the legislative
effect that characterizes decisions of American courts; the Swedish
system more closely resembles the idea of judicial restraint that
was prevalent during the Taney Court in the mid-19th century. 0
In large part this is due to the limitable nature of many Swedish
civil liberties and the more explicit nature of the Instrument of
Government itself.2 In Sweden, the nation is the fundamental governmental unit, and local governments can exercise only such powers as are specifically delegated to them. The constitutional laws
apply directly to municipalities as well. Thus it follows that there
is no need for a Swedish counterpart to the incorporative feature
of the 14th Amendment.
B.

Comparing Rights: Amendments Beyond the First

Although the Swedish Instrument of Government is generally
15.

The principles of stare decisis and national supremacy are stated in U.S. CONST.

art. VI § 2.
16. Sweden has two supreme courts: The Supreme Judicial Court and the Supreme
Administrative Court. IG 11:1. See U. NORDENSEN (trans. and commentator) CONsTrruTIONAL

17.

DOCUMENTS OF SWEDEN 29 (1976).
R. GINSBURG & A. BRAZELIuS, CIVIL

PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 10, 131 (1965).
IG 11:2. This has been interpreted to mean that Swedish precedents are not binding authority. M. CAPPELLETrI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 58-60 (1971).
19. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 149 (1803).
20. See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 18, at 59-69; R. NEWMEYER, THE SUPREME COURT

18.

UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY

21.

IG 2:12-2:15.

89-118 (1968).
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more explicit in its definition of rights-the U.S. Constitution is
more a statement of fundamental policy 2 which requires a greater
degree of interpretation-nearly every civil liberty recognized in
America has its Swedish counterpart.23 For example, the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment has
corresponding Swedish provisions, which specifically proscribe certain types of punishment: capital punishment, torture, banishment, and expatriation. 4
Life, liberty, and property interests cannot be impaired by the
U.S. government without "due process of law."25 State governments are similarly limited.2 In Sweden, too, there is constitutional recognition for the reverence of life,2 7 and laws affecting liberty or property are subject to various substantive and procedural
restraints.2 8 Anyone deprived of liberty is entitled to prompt review by a court, whether civil or criminal.2 9 No authority may
usurp the court's function by directing its decision in a given
case.

0

22. See W. LOCKHART, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76 (1976).
23. The provision of the Bill of Rights that is noticeably absent from the Swedish IG
is the right to "keep and bear arms." U.S. CONST. amend. II. See generally Levin, Right to
Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 CHI. [-]KENT. L. REV. 148
(1971). In October 1983, the Supreme Court let stand a ruling of the Seventh Circuit, Quilici
v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 194 (1983),
that the amendment did not guarantee a personal right to possess arms. The decision may
signal a new approach to interpretation of this constitutional provision. The omission of this
right from the Swedish IG has been explained by the theory that violence in any form is
more consequentially distasteful to Sweden; murder is rare and handguns virtually nonexistent. A. NELSON, RESPONSES TO CRIME: AN INTRODUCTION TO SWEDISH CRIMINAL LAW AND
ADMINiSTRATION 39. Sweden's failure to specify a right to keep and bear arms could also be
viewed as an extension of liberty rather than a constriction, insofar as the Swedish citizen is
thereby more likely to be free from armed attack. In addition to the absence of an arms
guarantee, Sweden's Instrument of Government has no rule of construction paralleling the
Ninth Amendment's catch-all clause (granting "other" rights to the people). See B. PArrRSON, THE FORGOTrEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955).
24. IG 8:1 and 2:5. See Browdy & Saltzman, The Effectiveness of the Eight Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 846 (1961); Granucci, "Nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L.
REv.839 (1969).
25. This clause has prompted voluminous litigation. See LOCKHART, supra note 22, at
420 et. seq.; L. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTUIONAL LAW 427 et seq. (1978).
26. See R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTrrtUTONAL LAW 379-82 (1981).
27. IG 8:1.
28. IG 8:2-8:5. These sections do not purport to limit the power of the Riksdag in any
way, but carve out areas of administrative power in such a manner that they are cased
firmly within the scope of legislative power. IG 2:18 provides a right to compensation when
the government takes private property for public use.
29. IG 11:3.
30. IG 11:2.
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The Instrument of Government, in its version of a preamble, declares equality before the law as a fundamental value.31 Moreover,
no law or other decree may even imply the discrimination of any
citizen because of race or ethnic origin, or on the grounds of his
belonging to a minority.-2 Sexual discrimination is likewise forbidden-"unless the relevant provision forms part of efforts to bring
about equality between men and women or concerns compulsory
military service."33 The exclusive protection of minorities suggests
that Swedish versions of "affirmative action" programs would not
be vulnerable to Bakke-type challenges. 4 In the United States,
age 5 and sex 6 discrimination by the government (and some private entities) are forbidden by statutes, and racial and religious
37
discrimination by the Constitution.
Although Swedish civil liberties may be enumerated in detail,
the rights of persons accused of crimes are not so broadly developed as they are in America. A prohibition against search and
seizure by the government is cast in absolute terms (rather than
merely prohibiting "unreasonable" intrusions), 8 but it is clear that
many of the procedural safeguards enjoyed by Swedes (including
the right to be free of searches and seizures) are susceptible to limitation by legislative acts.39 While the right to a trial is guaranteed,40 there is no requirement that a trial by jury be available to a
criminal defendant (except in prosecutions under the Press Act), 1
nor a specific prohibition of compelled self-incrimination (except
31. Id.
32. IG 2:15. See Oberg, Is Sweden Ripe For Racism?, 27 SOCIAL CHANGE IN SWEDEN
(Feb. 1983) (concluding that "the nation as a whole is determined not to let racists and
discriminators have a free hand").
33. Id.
34. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), casts some
doubt upon the validity of the use of racial classifications as a broad means of remedying
the efforts of past discrimination.
35. See The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-632 (1976 and
1981 Supp.).
36. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal Employment Opportunities, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 and 1981 Supp.) (sex discrimination in employment); Title
IX of The Education Amendment Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (sex discrimination
in education).
37. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was the seminal case in the area
of racial discrimination; as to religion, see West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
But see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
38. U.S. CONST. amend IV; IG 2:6.
39. IG 2:12-2:14.
40. IG 11:3.
41. FPA 12.2.
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where coercion of medical information is involved).

2

Nevertheless,

pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights"-to
which Sweden is a signatory-the observed practice is to afford
criminal defendants a "presumption of innocence,"" the right to
court-appointed counsel, 5 the right to compel defense witnesses to
testify, and the right to cross-examine all prosecution witnesses. 7
The Instrument of Government does include a prohibition of ex
post facto laws,4 and a right in criminal cases to a public trial
without undue delay. 0
C.

Comparing Rights: First Amendment Freedoms

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is a
brief and eloquent statement of principle, explicitly enumerating
basic liberties which cannot be abrogated by governmental action.
The courts have necessarily assumed the role of interpreting what
those rights are in the factual settings of cases where first amendment freedoms are claimed. As noted earlier, chapter 2 of the
Swedish Instrument of Government is substantially more specific
in its enumeration of similar rights;5 0 therefore, Swedish courts
have not been required to undertake the interpretive function.
Protection for freedom of religion is common to both the First
Amendment"' and the Instrument of Government. Although the
Lutheran church is the state church in Sweden, each person is
guaranteed the right to be free from governmental coercion to join
or support any religious body, or to make known his religious (or
political) opinions.5 2 Conversely, the individual's right to practice
his own religion and to join with others in so doing is absolutely
42. IG 2:5.
43. The Conventions provide a broad range of human rights and establish a court to
supervise these rights on an international level. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASsWELL & L.-C.
CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 197 n.103 (1980). Sweden has submitted to
the international court's jurisdiction. Id. at 298, 569-610. See also BASIC DOCUMENTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 338 (I. Brownlie ed. 1971), where permissible restrictions on civil liberties

are defined.
44.
45.

DANELius, supra note 4, at 10.
McDOUGAL & CHEN, supra note 43.

46.

Id.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
IG 2:10.
IG 11:3.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

51.

U.S. CONST. Amend. I.

52. IG 2:1.6. This juxtaposition of religious and political freedoms reflects the Swedish
consciousness of the overlap between politics and religion.
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protected. 3 While certain otherwise protected liberties may be
limited by acts of the Riksdag,54 the freedom of religion provision
conspicuously cannot.
This, of course, does not mean that Swedish freedom of religion
is unrestricted, any more than the absolute language of the First
Amendment conveys unlimited freedom of religion upon Americans. The United States Supreme Court has held that, although
belief itself is absolutely protected, action done in its furtherance
is subject to governmental regulation;55 certain state interests,
manifested in laws based on secular purposes, may be overriding."
A comparable line of reasoning applies in Sweden: religious expressions, themselves absolutely protected, are invariably manifested
through exercise of a "restrictable" freedom such as that of association, assembly, press, or expression; the belief itself, however, remains inviolate.
A more detailed analysis of First Amendment rights appears in
the context of the Skokie case, discussed later within this article.
Here it need be reiterated only that freedom of speech and of the
press and the right peaceably to assemble and petition the government are plainly guaranteed; the Supreme Court has elaborated
upon the rights of expression57 and association, 8 attendance at
criminal trials,59 and broadest of all, the right to privacy.60
Prior governmental restraints on the exercise of first amendment
freedoms carry a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality." Less
severe restrictions are evaluated through a balancing approach,
with the need for regulation weighed against the degree of protection that expression should enjoy.6 2 These limitations have been
judicially developed, since the Constitution makes no provision in
53. Id.
54. IG 2:12-2:14.
55. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
56. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,(1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See generally LOCKHART, supra
note 22, at 1215; TRIE, supra note 25, at 833.
57. This includes the right to speak as well as to refrain from speaking, Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), and extends to "symbolic expression," Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
58. See D. FELLMAN, THE CONsTrrUTIONAL RIGHT OF AsSOCIATION passim (1963).
59. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
60. Griswold v. Connecticut, 341 U.S. 479 (1965).
61. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931). But see Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (injunction of sale of
allegedly obscene material upheld).
62. Bogan, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 MD. L. REv. 387 (1979).
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its text for any restrictions."

The Swedish counterpart of these first amendment rights are described with some specificity." Thus guaranteed are the freedom
of expression; 65 the right to receive information; 66 freedom of assembly;67 the right to demonstrate;" freedom of association;69 and
70
a citizen's right to keep his opinions to himself.

Freedom of the press in Sweden is guaranteed separately by the
Freedom of the Press Act (FPA). Its first chapter provides that
there shall be no content-based restrictions except those in keeping
with "general law." Prior restraints are prohibited. Chapter 2 details the right of the press to gain access to official documents;
Chapter 3 protects anonymity of "sources"; Chapters 4 and 5 regulate the licensing and registration of editors and publishers, and
define their responsibility; Chapters 7 and 8 concern criminal liability for failure to comply with the FPA requirements, among
other things providing the accused a right to jury trial; Chapter 10
authorizes seizure and suppression of "illegal" materials; and
Chapter 11 addresses civil liability for defamation.
The noteworthy difference from the U.S. Constitution is that the
Instrument of Government explicitly sets limits on the exercise of
many liberties.7 ' The Riksdag may act to restrict various freedoms
of expression, assembly, association, etc., but only within definite
limits.
Such restriction... may be made only for achievement of a purpose which
is acceptable in a democratic society. The restriction may never go beyond
what is necessary with regard to the purpose which has given rise to it[;]
neither may it be extended so far that it constitutes a threat against the free
formation of opinion as one of the foundations of democracy. No restriction
may be made solely on the grounds of political, religious, cultural, or other
7
such ideas. 2
63. See infra Section Ill.
64. IG 2:1. This section spells out the right to obtain information and to "demonstrate" on publicly owned property.
65. IG 2:1.1.
66. IG 2:1.2. In the United States this is not a privilege of constitutional dimension,
but a statutory one.
67. IG 2:1.3.
68. IG 2:1.5.
69. IG 2:1.6
70. IG 2:2.
71. IG 2:12-2:14.
72. IG 2:12. Such restrictions on the Riksdag's power to limit protected liberties are
cast in terms of broad policy statements similar to the guarantees found in the Bill of
Rights. As such, they seem to express a recognition of judicial review.
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This governmental philosophy disfavoring content-based restrictions is completely compatible with most other rights granted by
the Instrument of Government, as well as with American notions
of civil liberties. Even with such similar philosophies, specific national differences arise. The Swedish government may, for example, constitutionally place limits on the freedom to make statements about economic activities. 73 "The freedom of association
may be restricted only as regards such associations the activities of
which are of a military or similar nature or which involve the persecution of a national group of a particular race, of a particular
skin colour, or of a particular ethnic origin. "' 4 One law, the power
of which is derived from that provision, bans the wearing of an
unauthorized military uniform in public: "It is prohibited to carry
uniforms or similar clothing that identify the political orientation
of the person wearing the uniform." This prohibition can also apply to parts of uniforms, arm bands and other similar clearly visible means of identification. 5 Another prohibits the defamation of
a race:
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other communication
which is spread among the public threatens or expresses contempt for a
group of a certain race, skin color, national creed, he shall be sentenced for
agitation against ethnic group to76imprisonment for at most two years or, if
the crime is petty, to pay a fine.

Taken together, it seems clear that a march of Nazis through the
streets of Stockholm would be preventable as a clear violation of
the law, unprotected by any claims of "fundamental freedom."
It must be remembered that the Instrument of Government is a
relatively new constitution, so any in-depth analysis of Swedish
free expression is difficult. It would seem, though, that the situational flexibility suggests one substantial criticism. In the absence
of a strong and independent judiciary, the civil liberties "guaranteed" by the Swedish system could be virtually meaningless-the
Riksdag has constitutional power to override them.7 The apparent
conclusion, however, is that the Swedish people appear to be less
73. IG 2:13. A similar statutory restriction in the United States would be patently

unconstitutional.
74. IG 2:14.

75. SFS 1947:164. Violation of this prohibition is punishable by day fines (determined
by one day's income). What has been worn is forfeited.... Id.
76. SWED. PENAL CODE ch. 16 § 8 (1972).
77. It is important to remember in this connection, however, that the International
Court of Human Rights is responsible for supervision of the Swedish protections.
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fearful of a majoritarian tyranny than before, and more trustful of
their democratic process. Certainly there is no social or historical
justification for describing Sweden as anything other than a free

and democratic country.

s

Sweden is characterized by a relatively homogeneous and socially structured culture. Swedes are far more interrelated with
(sometimes dependent upon) their government than Americans.
They appear to have great thrust in their democratic process and
look to it for protection of their civil liberties. The fact that the
government pervades the lives of the people in such an apparently
benign way should be taken as a measure of personal security, not
an indication of authoritarianism. Thus the Swedish laws prohibiting defamation of a race are, to the people who live under them,
innocuous, particularly when contrasted with the oppressions exercised by Nazi Germany which threatened all of Europe's in the
name of race superiority. History, as well as philosophy, shapes society's degree of toleration for laws.

III.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SPEECH IN SKOKIE

A.

The Nazis in Skokie

1. Purposes and Passions: A Chronological Summary0
Skokie, Illinois bills itself as "the world's largest village." A
78. Of course, a large gulf can exist between the theory and practice of civil liberties.
The Soviet Constitution, for example, is a model of guarantees for the natural rights of man.
Few observers, however, would characterize life in Russia as free by traditional democratic
standards. See R. SHARLr, THE NEW SOVIEr CONSTTTION OF 1977 16-17 (1978). By contrast, Sweden delivers a good deal more than it promises. See Oberg, Is Sweden Ripe For
Racism, 27 SOCIAL CHANGE IN SWEDEN 6 (Feb. 1983).
79. For the experience ofJews and non-Jews in Sweden's neighbor, Denmark, see, e.g.,
Jacobs, When the New Year Came in Springtime, Liberty, at 2-6 (Sept.-Oct. 1979). Sweden
itself was neutral, and was not directly occupied by Nazi Germany. Of course, it nevertheless was under the Nazi shadow. See generally R. PAXTON, EutOPE IN THE TwENTmTH CmETry (1975).
80. The events that took place in Skokie, Illinois, between March 1977 and June 1978
have been documented in detail elsewhere; likewise, the purposes and passions of the principles involved have been speculated upon and analyzed in depth. Which parties won the
battles, and who won the war, continue to be hotly debated questions. What follows in this
subsection, therefore, is a brief chronological summary, together with some editorial conclusions based on a consensus of the commentators and the writer's own admitted biases. See
A. Nmmi, DEFENDING My ENEmy (1979); Hamlin, Swastikas and Survivors, 4 Civ. Lm. Rv.
8 (Mar.-Apr. 1978). See also Danon, Illinois Supreme Court and the Appellate Court Decisions Regarding PriorRestraint,In Skokie v. The American Nazi Party, 67 ILL. B.J. 540-49
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suburb of Chicago, it has a population over 70,000 81-of whom
some 45,000 are Jewish"2 and a significant number survivors of
Nazi concentration camps.83 That statistical characteristic, together with the well-grounded suspicion that the appearance of
Nazi uniforms in Skokie would provoke a vehement, almost paranoid reaction among many residents, served to encourage a small
militant gang which called itself the American Nazi Party.8" In
early 1977, Frank Collin-self-styled leader of the American Nazis-applied for permits to demonstrate in various Chicago suburbs for the stated purpose of attracting attention to his "cause." 8 5
Hindsight permits the conclusion that, by their immediate and
outraged response, the residents of Skokie helped Collin accomplish his purpose. The other communities approached by the Nazis
had managed to rebuff them by way of innocuous demurrer: "We
are unable to accommodate you at this time," or "the space that
you requested has been previously reserved."8 Skokie, however,
used a legalistic device: it would acquiesce to the Nazis' request-provided that the group posted a huge insurance bond.8 7
Such a requirement, of course, would be difficult if not impossible
for Collin and his followers to meet. 88
The American Nazi Party was hardly a novice at constitutional
jurisprudence. It had already been successful in challenging similar
bonding requirements, 8 and Collin immediately recognized that he
was in a good legal position to attract considerable attention to his
group and irritate a sizeable number of Jews in the process. On
March 20, 1977, he sent a letter to the town, announcing that his
people would picket the Skokie municipal building to protest the
denial of the permit. 90
The village of Skokie filed suit to enjoin the demonstration, and
(1979); Horowitz & Bramson, Skokie, The ACLU and the Endurance of Democratic Theory, 43 LAW & CoNTaPw. PROBS. 328-48 (1979).
81. NEIER, supra note 80, at 39.
82. Hamlin, supra note 80, at 10.
83. Id.
84. Neier discusses the various splinter groups within the neo-Nazi fascist fringe in the
United States since World War II, among them the American Nazi Party, the National
Renaissance Party, and the National Socialists White People's Party. The American Nazis
under Collin claimed to have 40 members. Naw , supra note 80, at 13-16.
85. Hamlin, supra note 80.
86. Id.

87.

The bond was in the amount of $350,000.

88.
89.

Id.
NEIER, supra note 80, at 38-39.

90. Id.
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an Illinois court issued an injunction prohibiting Collin's group
from either marching or displaying a swastika.9 1
The Nazis, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union,
appealed, 92 but no Illinois appellate court would either stay the injunction pending appeal or grant an expedited review of the trial
court's decision. 9 8 The ACLU thereafter appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held
that prior restraints on free expression could be valid only if the
state provides strict procedural safeguards, such as immediate appellate review; without these safeguards, a state appellate court
must stay an injunction." On remand, the intermediate appellate
court modified its injunction, permitting the Nazis to demonstrate
so long as no swastika would be displayed.95
The ACLU, however, persisted in defending the principle that
the Nazis' activity, however abhorrent, amounted to no more than
speech, and as such was protected by the Constitution. This time
the Illinois Supreme Court felt constrained to agree, and concluded
that the injunction should be vacated in its entirety."
In the meanwhile, the village of Skokie had passed several new
ordinances aimed at keeping the Nazis out of town. The ordinances provided, among other things, that permits had to be obtained (and insurance bonds posted) before any public parades or
assemblies could be held; that dissemination of material which was
intended to incite racial or religious hatred was forbidden; and that
public demonstrations by political parties whose members wore
military uniforms were also prohibited. 7
Passage of these ordinances brought the inevitable Constitutional challenge from Collin and the ACLU-and this time a federal district court found the laws to be unconstitutional.98 A predictable scenario ensued, as the United States Court of Appeals
91. Id. at 43.
92. Id at 48. See also National Socialist Party of American v. Village of Skokie, 432
U.S. 43 (1977).
93. See id.
94. Id. Justice White would have denied the stay. Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the grounds that no final state court decision had been
rendered. Id. at 44-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 51 m.App.3d 279 (1977),
rev'd. in part, 69 IlM.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
96. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 M.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d
21 (1978).
97. Skokie Mun. Ord. 994-96 (1977). See also Nma, supra note 80, at 48-49.
98. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. I. 1978), af'd., 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
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affirmed the result" and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 100
Ultimately, although the Nazis had won the right to march in
Skokie, they never did so. Collin achieved exactly what he had set
out to do: he attracted national attention to his controversial cause
by provoking the Jews of Skokie into visible outrage.101
2.

The Failed Constitutional Arguments

The village of Skokie attempted to prevent the Nazis from
marching through the municipality in their uniforms. It failed because the town was unable to formulate precisely why the Nazi
parade should not be protected by the first amendment. In retrospect, it is not difficult to understand why the traditional exceptions to the free speech guarantee were argued unsuccessfully.
Under the "fighting words" exception, first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in 1942,102 utterances that are directed face-to-face

at an individual who had not voluntarily exposed himself to invective are deemed the practical equivalent of immediate, shocking,
injurious-and restrainable-speech aimed at a "captive audience." The most famous example was provided by Justice Holmes:
"No freedom of speech would protect one who falsely shouts fire in
a theater and causes panic."103 Theater patrons are captive (having
no advance warning of a statement or demonstration, they are not
free to avoid it), the message is false, 0 4 and opposing speech is
inefficacious. "Fighting words" have the same elements of surprise,
and will likely provoke a response (violence, as opposed to panic)
from a listener who had no chance to avoid listening. Such expression has passed into the realm of abuse of the freedom of speech.
Skokie's argument based on "fighting words" was inappropriate,
in that both the speakers (uniformed Nazis) and the addressees
(the populace of Skokie) were groups. The doctrine of fighting
words requires individual, one-on-one provocation; the courts
would not accept the argument that the Nazis' symbolic anti-Semitic speech constituted fighting words directed against each Jew
99. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
100. 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
101. See NEIER, supra note 80, at 58-62.
102. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
103. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
104. It should be stressed that this criterion loses its value when the speech contains
statements that are not verifiably true or false but are expressions of doctrine or opinion. It
is the immediacy of the message that permits it to inflict damage before opposing speech
can counter its effects.
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in Skokie. 10 5 Furthermore, the advance publicity of the parade
eliminated the element of surprise.10 6 Neither, suggested the court,
was any resident forced to witness the Nazi march: knowing in advance that the swastika would be displayed in the town square
(usually deserted on weekends anyway), those offended could easily avoid seeing it by staying away.107
For much the same reason, the clear-and-present-danger argument 08 also failed. Advocacy of a viewpoint must not cross the line
between public peace and spontaneously solicited violence; where
incitement to riot is the speaker's very purpose, it is "a substantive
evil which the state has a right to prevent."10 9 Even then, the
speech remains protected unless there is a reasonable likelihood of
imminent lawless action against a third party.110 Neither of these
conditions existed in Skokie: any violence would have been directed against the speaker, himself, not against others at his urging. Thus the incitement-to-riot exception cannot apply to a hostile (even violent) reaction by those who simply oppose the
speaker's views. More specifically, a police officer's perception that
there is a clear and present danger of violent disorder does not by
105. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 Ill.2d 605, 608, 373
N.E.2d 21, 24 (1978). In his dissent to the denial of certiorari, Justice Blackmun came close
to indicating that he would hold on the merits for Skokie, on the basis of such a likely
eventuality. There was evidence of a "potentially explosive and dangerous situation, inflamed by unforgettable recollections," into which the Nazis would deliberately come,
"taunting and overwhelmingly offensive." At the very least, it is clear from this that Justice
Blackmun would be receptive to arguments so framed. 439 U.S. 916, 918 (1978). For further
discussion of this issue, see Linzer, The Meaning of CertiorariDenials, 79 COL. L. Rzv.
1227, 1265 (1979).
106. If uniformed Nazis stormed a synagogue during services, shouting "heil Hitler,"
the situation would obviously be different. The example is Neier's, see supra note 80, at 141.
107. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 11.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d
21, 25-26 (1978).
108. Discusson of these four words is plentiful. See J. ELY, DzMocRACy mD DISTRUST
107-08 (1980); Linde, Clear and Present DangerReexamined, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970);
Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the Clear-and-Present-DangerTest, 63 HARv. L.
Rev. 1167 (1950); Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct And the First Amendment, 70
CAL. L. REv. 1159 (1982). There is no scarcity of discussions of the subject in the United
States Reports, either. See, e.g., Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (applying a somewhat differently articulated clear and present danger test); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
109. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Although the clear and present
danger exception is frequently abbreviated to those four words, the meaning of Justice
Holmes' formulation is lost if the remainder of the test is overlooked: "[D]anger of substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent" may not constitute a bright line, but it
makes clear the limited nature of the exception, as the word "danger" does not. Id. at 52.
110. Mere advocacy of abstractions is not actionable. See Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957).
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itself allow him to intercede; he can step in only when the
speaker's exhortations suggest the very violence to be performed-not merely that the visceral reaction of the audience gives
rise to the disorder. To treat speech any differently would render it
subject to the "heckler's veto," thereby making legitimate but unpopular expression (for example, advocacy of busing to achieve racial integration) legally suppressible."' While freedom of the press
may belong to those who own the presses, freedom of speech is
more nobly universal; it must not depend upon a speaker's superior command of force.

The above-mentioned exceptions are all context-based. That is,
what the speaker actually says is not directly at issue, but because
of the circumstances in which the speech is made it may be punished or, (in rarer circumstances) prevented." 2 Thus it would be
hard to characterize as fighting words utterances that are spoken
with a disarming smile. s Likewise, advocacy of (even imminent)
lawless action is probably protected," 4 if there is no receptive au111. Unfortunately, the application of this distinction has been difficult. In Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), the Supreme Court went through a tortuous causal analysis
to justify a speaker's arrest. Feiner had taken to a street corner in Syracuse to voice his
displeasure with what he perceived to be racist policies in the city government. An onlooker
threatened to attack him if the police officer present did not interrupt the discourse. The
officer responded by arresting Feiner for a breach of the peace. His subsequent conviction
was upheld by two New York appellate courts, and the Supreme Court affirmed. See generally TRIM, supra note 25, at 622-25. Note, Free Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 489 (1951).
112. While law that prohibits certain types of expression may be said to chill the
rights themselves, through the prospect of punishment for violation, a prior restraint in the
form of an injunction effectively freezes them. Where fully protected speech is at issue, (see
infra text accompanying notes 137-48), virtually no prior restraints will ever be issued except in the context of a judicial "gag order" (which itself is subject to a heavy presumption
of unconstitutionality). The rationale militating against prior restraints under the above
mentioned exceptions is that a danger cannot be clear or present until the words in question
are uttered-and that words still unspoken cannot be considered to be provocative of violence. Cases involving prior restraints have been limited to those involving national security,
see, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, mandamus denied sub nom.
Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 699 (1931) (dictum); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring),
preservation of fairness of criminal trails, see e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
(dictum), and obscenity. See, e.g., Kingsly Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). But
see Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). It appears that only the most serious of
highly probable dangers will justify a prior restraint of protected speech.
113. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
114. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (disorderly conduct charges disfavored
as a means of abridging speech). Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (criminal
syndicalism statute fatally overbroad). These current cases impose a stricter standard upon
the government than did the earlier line in which the danger exception was first developed.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
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dience being spurred on. And, listeners need not always be "captive" to the speaker; if they can reasonably anticipate what they
will hear, the speech cannot be suppressed.11
The Supreme Court has ruled that speech may be subjected t
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, 116 so long as they
are neither too broad nor permit administrative discretion which
could become in effect a veto power."1 Although the content of the
proposed speech cannot be a factor in the decision whether to issue
a permit,118 a speaker may constitutionally be punished if the context in which he speaks violates reasonable regulations, duly authorized and implemented.' 1
The Skokie ordinance by which the municipal government
sought to prevent the Nazi parade was indeed a regulation according to time, place, and manner,120 but it amounted to putting the
entire community off-limits to the Nazis forever. Thus it fell far
outside permissible standards of restraints. 12 1 In fact, what the
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). So-called subversive association and expression now requires the elements of imminency and likely success. See M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SuPREME COURT AND JuDiciAL RIVmw 55 (1966).
115. The captive audience doctrine relates to expectations of privacy, as well as surprise. See Note, "Offensive Speech" and the First Amendment, 53 B.U.L. Rav. 834, 847
(1973) (discussing Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972)); N. DonsEN, P. BEsNDE, B.
NEUBORN, I POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 627 (4th ed. 1976).
116. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
117. Permissible time, place, and manner restrictions may include a permit requirement for public parades and demonstrations. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941), which provided that such permits are not allocated in a discriminatory fashion.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). For the speech to have first amendment
protection it must take place in a generally recognized public forum. See, e.g., Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (no constitutional right to hold protest at state penitentiary);
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1961
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Note, A Unitary Approach of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned
Property, 35 STAN. L. Rav. 121 (1982). Similarly, handbills placed in mailboxes are not protected, United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburg Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981), and a state may prohibit writing on walls of public buildings. See Metromedia, Inc.
v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 549-50 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
118. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272,
281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 36-37, appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215
N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
913 (1961). See Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because Of Its Content, 46 U. Cm. L. Rav. 81
(1978); Redish, The Content Distinction In First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. RAy.
113 (1981).
119. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). If the Nazis marched through Skokie's residential streets with a sound truck, blasting out anti-semitic epithets, the speech could be
interrupted and punished.
120. See supra text accompanying note 97.
121. See the discussion in NmER, supra note 80, at 115, where the author discusses the
attempt by the mayor of Jersey City to put the city off-limits to labor organizers. Hague v.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:77

village of Skokie wanted to do was to stop the Nazis because of the
content of their symbolic speech, the diabolical purpose of which
was to tap a vast reservoir of shock, bitterness, and moral abhorrence which they knew would conjure up gruesome images of the
evils perpetrated by Nazi Germany. On one hand, Collin and his
group fully understood that the memories of Holocaust survivors
were indelible and excruciating, that the mere thought of a swastika in America would generate horror, fear, and recrimination,
and that the publicity value of their "threat" was substantial. On
the other hand, the objects of their perversion, the citizens of Skokie, felt that a symbolic victory over the American Nazis-an overwhelming repudiation of the swastika-would yield some small
measure of psychic vindication.
Can any speech be restricted on the basis of its content? One
need look no further than the obscenity laws to reach the answer:
of course. A reasoned analysis of the present state of content regulation suggests that, when the issue is properly framed, the type of
situation which the Nazis threatened in Skokie may well be regulated within constitutional bounds. But while such an objective is
not inherently unconstitutional, its pursuit should be strategically
sound. Though contextual restriction has come to be a more accepted means of regulating speech, 2 ' in the Skokie situation the
issue of the words themselves should have been met head on.
B.

"Theories of Free Speech"

A persistent shibboleth in the American experience is that free
speech gives everyone the right to speak his mind-indeed, that
the Constitution guarantees absolute freedom of self-expression,
and anything which restricts this right is the first step on the road
toward tyranny.' That "no law [abridging the freedom of speech]
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).

122. The disfavored nature of content-based restrictions is a universally accepted element of American constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Police. Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). See also Tribe, supra note 25, at 580-85, and the excellent explanation by W. Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review Of The Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. Ray.
107, 139-48 (1982). But see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (content of speech must
be examined to determine if it is protected by the first amendment). See also infra text
accompanying notes 149-56.
123. "Another such victory," said Justice Black, "and I am undone." See Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267-75 (1981) (Black, J., dissenting). Unless Justice Black could
categorize the speech at issue as other than "pure," Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), he would have
responded to any abridgment with this road-to-doom scenario.
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means no law" was the position of Justices Black and Douglas. 124
In the vernacular, "it's a free country-I can say whatever I
please."
The very existence of the doctrines in exception-fighting words,
clear and present danger, captive audience, and time/place/manner-belies the simplistic popular understanding of free speech.
Each of them, however, restrict speech on the basis of context, and
the idea persists that content cannot be regulated. After all, speech
is merely the verbal expression of the speaker's thoughts, beliefs,
and opinions, and it is unarguable that in America there shall be
absolute freedom to think what one wants. It does not, however,
follow either legally, logically, or philosophically that one may
openly express whatever he thinks, whenever and wherever he
12 5
wants.

The source of this basic confusion is the familiar word "speech"
itself. Constitutionally, speech must be understood as a term of
art."2 6 As one commentator suggests, the ordinary meaning of
speech is both overinclusive-for example, telling military secrets
to an enemy agent is speech which is not protected-and underinclusive-such as the silent wearing of an armband, which is protected as symbolic speech. 127 On the other hand, recognition that
the first amendment protects a particular type of speech leads logically to the inquiry: what are the parameters of action and utterance to be protected against abridgement?
1. The Intent of the Framers
Traditionally, interpretation of the Constitution begins with
124. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring); W.O. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LmE'rY 362 (1954).
125. See State v. Dixon, 78 Wash.2d 796, 479 P.2d 931,938 (1971); T. JEFFERSON, IrTER TO JAMES MADISON, July 31, 1788, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 141
(Dumbauld, ed. 1955) (discussing liability of publishers for false facts printed, despite freedom of the press, and criminal acts dictated by religious error as punishable despite free
exercise of religion guarantee).
126. See generally Schauer, Speech and "Speech," Obscenity and "Obscenity," 67
GEo. L.J. 889, 906 (1979).
127. Tinker, supra note 123. Accord Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1939) (flag
display). See generally Alfrange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct-The Draft Card
Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091
(1968). Compare Sweden's law prohibiting the wearing of armbands, supra note 75 and accompanying text; Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 321, 362
(1979) (racial friction generated by the wearing of buttons proclaiming "White is right" and
"Happy Easter, Dr. King" led 6th Circuit to uphold school rule banning all buttons, even
though this banned students from wearing button protesting the Vietnam War).
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studying the intent of its Framers. Much has been made of
Thomas Jefferson's libertarian perspective on free speech: that the
best way to deal with error is to permit its correction by truth.12
"The bar of public reason" 1 9 will generally provide the remedy for
abuses occasioned by the unfettered dissemination of information.
Only when the security and peace of society is threatened, Jefferson felt, should the discussion of political, economic, and social affairs be restrained.- 0 James Madison, often called the architect of
the Bill of Rights, wrote in The Federalistthat freedom of speech
(and of the press) would make possible a reasoned citizenry that
would in turn keep the government in check."'
The most recent historical scholarship concludes, however, that
no clear "intent" underlying the First Amendment can be identified. 3 2 The Framers perceived the Constitution to be an instrument dealing with the relationship of the state governments and
the newly established "general government." The rights and responsibilities of individuals lay primarily in relation to state governments, whose respective constitutions protected freedom of
speech and press." The drafters of the Constitution carved out
expressly designated powers of the federal government from state
power. Not all freedoms were easily recognized. On the final day of
the constitutional convention, for example, a provision that "the
liberty of the Press should inviolably be observed" was proposed
and was promptly voted down, because (said the delegates) "[i]t is
unnecessary-the power of Congress does not extend to the
Press." ' " Eventually, the Bill of Rights was adopted-but only
partially as an additional guarantor of liberty;"3 primarily, it was a
128. DOUGLAS, supra note 124, at 362 (quoting Thomas Jefferson on free speech).
129. T. Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, in JEFFERSON, supra note
125, at 44.
130. DOUGLAS, supra note 124, at 362. Justice Douglas naturally interpreted Jefferson's meaning as in accord with his own 'absolutist' stance. But the argument made by the
state in favor of any given abridgment of speech is always that social peace and security is
being threatened. See infra text accompanying notes 171-74.
131. Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The ConstitutionalDialectic of Free Speech and
Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. Rzv. 222, 229 (1967).
132. See J. MAcG. BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LmERTY 60-62 (1982); BeVier, The First
Amendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978); Halman, How Much Of Our Speech Is Free?, 2 Civ. Lm. Rv.
111, 113 (1975).
133. BURNS, supra note 132, at 539-40.
134. BURNS, supra note 132, at 62.
135. JEFFERSON, supra note 125, at 140 (letter to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787: "a bill
of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or
particular") (emphasis added).
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bargaining chip to procure state ratification. 6
None of this is to diminish the importance of the Bill of Rights,
but merely to caution against expectation that understanding the
"intent of the Framers" will resolve the question of precisely what
they sought to protect by the first amendment. Simply put, there
was no extensive, carefully considered debate on the subject. The
governing principle of the American Revolution was less individual
1
freedom than self-government. 7
For some constitutional scholars, it is that principle of self-government which sufficiently identifies the parameters of the first
amendment: Congress is forbidden from abridging "the freedom of
a citizen's speech . . .whenever [it has anything to do with] the
governing of the nation."13 8 The governing function is interpreted
broadly, to include political, economic, and social issues.13 9 Put
more succinctly, the first amendment encompasses "the free and
robust exchange of ideas and political debate.' ' 4 0 The federal system of checks and balances, together with state-federal divisions of
authority, was devised to prevent government from presenting an
unlimited (more easily tyrannical) front against the people. 41 1 Similarly, the various guarantees of the Bill of Rights effectively prevent a "tyranny of opinion" from being concentrated in any one
institution or person, and serve to ensure social, political, and religious pluralism. It is thus virtually impossible for popular self-government to be defeated by consolidation of control." 2 To say that
government was perceived by the Framers as a necessary evil" 3 is
probably less accurate than to suggest that the Constitution was
drafted in such a way that made the cooperation of competing interests the price for protecting the liberty of each."4 In short, the
BURNS, supra note 132, at 542-43.
137. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. Rav. 245, 264.
138. Id. at 256. See also BeVier, supra note 132.
139. Meiklejohn, supra note 137, at 255. To Meiklejohn the goal appears to be the
acquisition by voters of "intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the
general welfare"-a weighty purpose indeed for speech to play. See also Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment And The Evils That Congress Has A Right To Prevent, 26 IND. L.J. 477,
488 (1951).
140. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973). See also Finnis, supra note 131, at
238.
141. BURNS, supra note 132, at 60-61.
142. Id.
136.

143.

See P. UsrINov, My RussiA 204, 209 (1983).

144. If the intent of the Framers is basic to delineating the scope of the free speech
guarantee, this provides one of the strongest arguments against protecting racial defamation. Such group libel deliberately exacerbates group tensions, playing negatively upon the
heterogeneous character of American society. The stirring up of racial or ethnic "fears, hate,
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guarantee of free speech was one of the ways by which to enable
expression of the will of the citizens in the representative government established by the Revolution and Constitution. 4 5
Thus, the narrowest historical interpretation of the free speech
clause would limit its protection to speech with political content. 4 '
(The Supreme Court's willingness to protect the wearing of a jacket with offensive words lettered on it 47 or black armbands in
school can be explained by the political nature of resistance to the
unpopular war in Vietnam.)148 The broadest interpretation of the
first amendment has come from those who find an absolutist intent
on the part of the Framers. The Supreme Court has, however,
adopted neither extreme. Instead, it has identified political speech
as merely the central value to be protected. Such evaluation logically requires consideration of content: that is, what the speaker
IN AMERICAN LAW 59 (1973), is fundamentally opposed to
the Framer's intent to ensure cooperative social pluralism. Insofar as differences of opinion
are protected by the first amendment, the tenor of debate may be anywhere between polite
and bitterly caustic. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). But racial defamation is essentially different. By casting contempt on a group on the basis of race or
ethnicity, the goal is not to participate in debate founded on the principle of pluralism, but
to destroy it. In this sense, racial defamation is subversive speech. Unlike political extremism, in which, (however distorted its form) the Framers' principle of self-government is evident, the principle underlying racial defamation is pure discrimination. Invidious racial and
ethnic discrimination has been rejected as anthithetical to American national policy, See
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983). The positive intent of the framers
to found a nation based on pluralism should not, therefore, be distorted to tolerate the free
rein of vindictive attack which is unrelated, except in appearance, to any constitutional or

guilt and greed," D. BELL, RACISM

national purpose. See, e.g.,

EPSTEIN

& A. FosTER, THE

RADICAL RIGHT

40 (1967);

McDoUGAL

supra note 43, at 581-83, 602; Brown, Racialism and the. Rights of Nations, 21
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 13 (1945); Note, supra note 115, at 854. See infra text accompanying
notes 194-315.
145. The free speech guarantee is thus a means to the end, not the end in itself. See
Schauer, supra note 126, at 920 ("free speech is seen as an instrument of good, not as a good
in itself"). See also BURNS, supra note 132, at 62:
Both sides [federalists and anti-federalists] invoked the Declaration of Independence
and its call for the supreme values of liberty and equality. But what kind of liberty
and equality?. . . [Tihe issue that would become the grandest question of them all the extent to which government should interfere with some persons' liberties in order
to grant them and other persons more liberty and equality - this issue lay beyond
the intellectual horizons.
Id.
146. See, e.g., F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENrrY 13-14 (1976) (discussing freedom of
the press).
147. Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SuP. CT.
REv. 285, 286-87.
148. See also DORSEN & BENDER, supra note 115, at 590, for a discussion of Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), where a flag burning was treated as political symbolic
speech.
& CHEN,
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wants to say. 4 9
2. Content Evaluation in Claims for Free-Speech Protection:
a. Theories and Results
Judicial analysis of claims to free-speech protection generally results in one of three conclusions: (a) the act in question, such as
political speech, is fully within the ambit of the guarantee, and
may be regulated only according to time, place, and manner;15 0 (b)
it is outside the reach of the first amendment, which does not protect every kind of expression (for example, obscenity);151 or (c) its
content is at least tangentially within the amendment, but competing factors may outweigh the speech to such an extent that governmental restrictions beyond mere time, place, and manner regulation are permissible (such as "fighting words").1 52 Usually, the
competing factors in this last category are contextual-but not always. In some cases, otherwise protected content may be outweighed by its socially harmful nature or its minimal relationship
to constitutionally protected, valuable speech.153
Every first amendment/free speech case, therefore, necessarily
presents an appellate court with a judgment to be made either on
its content or the context in which it has been (or will be) uttered,
or both. Category (c) has often functioned as a catchall-covering
as it does everything from commercial speech to soft-core pornography-and has most given rise to the murky waters of first
149. The motivation behind particular protected speech as a basis for regulation cannot be questioned. Cf. Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 138
(1961) (protected speech aimed at elimination of competition did not violate antitrust laws);
Henrico Prof. Firefighters Assoc., Local 1508 v. Board of Supervisors, 649 F.2d 237, 245 n.12
(1981) (speaker's motivation irrelevant to first amendment analysis). Any analysis of a
speaker's motivation would necessarily scrutinize both the sincerity of his belief in certain
ideas and his reasons for expressing them. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S.
50, 64-66 (1975); Finnis, supra note 131, at 222-23.
150. See DORSEN & BENDER, supra note 148, at 513-14; Finnis, supra note 131, at 237.
151. Schauer, supra note 126, at 911, 914.
152. Schauer, supra note 147, at 305.
153. The 1982 case of New York v. Ferber, illustrates the latter result, restriction
purely on the basis of content. The Supreme Court construed a New York statute prohibiting the distribution of non-obscene material in which a minor was depicted engaged in sexual activity. Although the material was described as "child pornography," the defendant was
not prosecuted under the obscenity portion of the statute (which also prohibited the distribution of such material.) Because of the harmful nature of the material, and its minimal
social value, the Court upheld the conviction irrespective of whether the expression was
obscene or not. 102 S.Ct. 3348 (1982).
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amendment analysis.'
Ultimately the more realistic assessment of Supreme Court
treatment of the speech guarantee-and the most accurate prediction of future holdings-is not found in any of the free-speech theories offered by the courts and commentators. The Supreme Court,

fundamentally, is result-oriented. All within constitutional bounds,
it will consider the interest of the speaker in his expression, the
state in its regulation, and the public in its right to know and to be
free of harassment. 15 ' The plethora of first amendment analyses-the various tests, doctrines, and principles which many schol-

ars are fond of creating and defending-provide at best the means
by which the Court's eventual result can be explained. '56
In essence, free-speech claims which are neither clearly protected nor excluded are subjected to judicial weighing, or balancing.1 57 The methodology of this decisional process is variously described in first amendment jurisprudence. The "preferred
position" approach, for example, gives a presumptive weight to the
right of free speech.1 58 The burden to overcome that presumption
154. That is, legal analysis-as distinct from factual conclusions about speech.
155. David Riesman sets forth the parameters of the task with a precision that lays
bare the challenge of this area of constitutional jurisprudence: "What individuals... and
what groups. . . should be protected against what sorts of statements, and by what legal
mechanism-and how at the same time can one protect legitimate social criticism and the
give and take of democratic policy, and avoid prejudiced application of the law?" Riesman,
Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. Rav. 727, 733-34 (1942).
156. Defamation provides one of the clearest examples of the inability of theorists to
agree on a controlling principle necessitating that result. Since it is closely related to political speech (the central first amendment value), defamation of public officials and public
figures is protected (in the absence of actual malice). New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). See Meiklejohn, supra note 137, at 259. Where a plaintiff is libelled, the states
may hold the speaker to a much lower standard of fault. See Comment, The Constitutional
Law of Defamation: Are All Speakers Protected Equally?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 166 (1983).
Some commentators indicate that malicious public defamation and private libel are unprotected (category b) because they lack constitutional value; others insist the speech is protected, but easily outweighed by the competing public interest in reputation (category c).

See, e.g.,

DORSEN

& BENDER supra note 148, at 514;

SHAPIRO,

supra note 114, at 157-59;

Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. Rzv. 1123, 1200 (1978). Regardless of the jurisprudence theory, the
result remains the same-and no more clearly understood for the philosophical debate.
157. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra note 139, at 484-85; Schauer, supra note 126, at 906.
158. The "preferred position" doctrine found its first official expression in Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945), where prior restraint on a speech by a labor organizer
was held to impare the rights of workers who had gathered to hear him. Justice Rutledge,
speaking for the majority, stated that the Court had the duty to say where an individual's
freedom ends and the State's power begins: "Choice on that border now as always delicate,
is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms
secured by the First Amendment."
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is substantial: in the absence of a showing of clear and present
danger, or grave abuse to public interests, the right of unfettered
speech is deemed paramount.5 9 According to some commentators,
the preferred position doctrine merely distinguishes thought and
action; 60 verbal expression of thought is protected, active expression is not.161
Others take the right further, interpreting it as one not merely
preferring speech, but as a right of free expression"--even a right
to be left alone.1 68 Such characterizations often butt up against one
another. In 1938, for example, a New York State court protected
the "free expression" of one who showered a Jewish neighborhood
with anti-semitic leaflets. Without pause or traditional analysis,
the judge spoke of liberty, democracy, and free speech as one runon doctrine.'" (If the burden to overcome the preferred position of
Although the Supreme Court occasionally disclaims the existence of their hierarchy
among the fundamental freedoms it recognizes first amendment liberties have enjoyed a
favored position relative to the other guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. The first
amendment has been said to embody "the indispensable condition, of nearly every other
form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). The language itself reflects the emphasis that the Framers placed on the fundamental freedoms. See Gard, The
Absoluteness of the First Amendment, 58 NEB. L. Rv. 1053, 1074 (1979) and, for an interesting historical analysis, Calm, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L. J. 464
(1956). These were certainly a driving force behind the American Revolution-perhaps the
main reason that the first federation was so weak. See A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMESICAN CONSTITUTION 95-96 (5th ed. 1976). Protection of free expression has long spurred one
of the Supreme Court's more activist roles. The concept of a limited government came to be
diluted by commerce clause litigation, see E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. 1054 (1983),
Wichard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
The federal judiciary came to perceive its own obligation to protect individual rights against
governmental infringement: thus the incorporation of the First Amendment, making it applicable to the states as well as the federal government. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEw AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1981); R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITTImONAL LAw 374-83
(1981).
159. To say "free speech" occupies the preferred position is broader than the language
used in Thomas v. Collins, supra note 158. The Court spoke of the burden on restraint of
"orderly discussion and persuasion." 323 U.S. at 530. In the setting of Skokie, each one of
these terms could be argued as inapplicable. If orderly, it was only superficially so. And
neither discussion nor persuasion characterized the Nazis' speech. See infra text accompanying notes 284-90, 303-07.
160. SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 71.
161. Id. at 55-57.
162. Haiman, supra note 132, at 124.
163. See, e.g., Haiman, supra note 132, at 113 (discussing Thomas Emerson's "full
protection" theory); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the FirstAmendment, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1205, 1208 (1976).
164. People v. Downer, 6 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1938). The Court concluded with the "hope
that this defendant will soon relieve himself of the bitterness in his heart and help to spread
good will towards all. .. ." Id. at 568.
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speech is heavy, it must be overwhelming to outweigh "liberty"
itselfW.) 16 5
Still another approach was typified by the late Justice Frankfurter. He rejected the preferred position as overly rigid, choosing
instead to weigh the specific interests before the court."'8 Such "ad
hoc balancing" can succeed in identifying rival or reciprocal interests, 167 but it can leave speech vulnerable. 6 8 The state can usually
offer a strong rationale for regulation in any particular case.
A more protective alternative is "definitional balancing. 1 69
Types of speech, not individual cases, are balanced against freespeech interests. Defamation, for example, as a defined type of
speech 170 would be held unprotected.
All of the formulas-preferred position, free expression, ad hoc
or definitional balancing-attempt to formulate a methodology by
which courts may proceed to adjust the interests before them. Regardless of the doctrine, however, those interests remain basically
the same.
The state's position is usually akin to the proposition enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Cox v. New Hampshire'7 1 that civil liberties presuppose the existence of ordered liberty.17 2 The challenged
speech is said to threaten such order either directly (as through a
breach of the peace) or indirectly (as through an injury to reputation, privacy, or some other right).7 3 It is argued, however, that
165. See Schauer, supra note 126, at 910-15 (rejecting the position "that freedom of
speech is mainly an undistinguishable subset of a broader notion of individual liberty").
166. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See SHAPnto, supra note 114, at 89-90; Schauer, supra note 126, at 904.
167. See SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 101.
168. SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 102. See also Nimmer, The Right To Speak From
Time to Time: FirstAmendment Theory Applied To Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CAL. L. REv. 935, 938-41 (1968).
169. Nimmer, supra note 168, at 942-48.
170. Id. at 933. Not only would the state's interest in protecting individual reputations
suffer if defamation were freely allowed, but the free-speech interest itself would be undermined by the spectre of "reputation assasins" able to verbally assault whomever they chose.
Id.
171. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
172. The statement, frequently quoted, reads: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses." Id. at 574.
173. State criminal libel statutes embody the dual state interests underlying the
claimed need to regular speech. Although often treated as a legal anachronism, it has not
completely disappeared. See, e.g., U.S. v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Md. 1974); Gottschalk v. Alaska, 575 P.2d 289 (1978).
See generally Note, ConstitutionalityOf The Law Of Criminal Libel, 52 COLUM. L. RPv.
521 (1952). See also Note, Defamation Of A Group, 21 NOTRE DME LAW. 21 (1945) (crimi-
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the threat of deleterious effect need not constitutionally be tolerated; "the Constitution is not a suicide pact."""4
In contradistinction to the state's claims on behalf of regulation
are the interests of free speech. Even under ad hoc balancing,
courts look less to the individual speaker's right to deliver his message than to the people's interest in the free flow of information,
for fuand to the greater risk to liberty of establishing precedents
17 5
ture suppression of constitutionally valuable speech.
At least one commentator has suggested that a major refinement
of free-speech doctrine is taking place, a kind of codification of the
first amendment.1 7 According to this theory the Supreme Court
has come to treat the amendment as a constitutional umbrella
under which a great variety of communicative activity and governmental interests are adjusted. Rather than treating speech broadly
as either protected or not,1 77 narrow categories are identified by

the Court, which then applies a balancing type of analysis.1 7 8 Innal libel may provide source of liability for defamation of group). But see Riesman, supra
note 155, at 745 (concluding that criminal libel and breach of the peace are "clumsy weapons for . . . intricate social regulation"). By precisely articulating its interest, the state is
more likely to successfully defend any asserted regulation over speech.
174. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963).
175. Identifying the competing interests, labelling them distinctively, and assigning
appropriate weight to each is the stuff of which first amendment articles, books and court
opinions are made. In the latter, a result-orientation to the facts presented will clarify what
the court says it is doing in its Constitutional analysis. Compare Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951) (height of McCarthy era) with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957) (McCarthyism discredited).
176. Schauer, supra note 147. The concept of specialized communicative categories
seems foreshadowed in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
177. The landmark case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), identified
types of speech considered to be outside of the protection of the First Amendment regardless of the context in which uttered: profanity, obscenity, libel, epithets, personal abuse.
Although diverse in nature, they were alike in being marginal to the "market-place of
ideas." See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Apart from these categories, limitations based on content were examined carefully, to ensure
that they did not restrict content under the guise of regulating time/place/manner of delivery, or (where clear and present danger or a fighting words/breach of the peace was alleged)
to determine that the facts were as grave as claimed by the state.
178. Schauer, supra note 147, at 313. Schauer lists the narrow categories identified
through Ferber,each with "its own corpus of sub-rules, principles, categories, qualifications,
and exceptions." Id. at 308-09. The advantage to narrow categories of speech is that courts
need not protect marginal speech on the ground that state regulation might allow infringement of non-marginal speech. Id. at 287. (He notes also the disadvantage, namely, that applying different analyses to categories of speech may be too difficult for prosecutors and
courts. Id. at 288.) Cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, Brandenburg and the Klan, Cohen,
and Frank Collins are examples of protected marginal speech. Id. at 286-87. However, Jehovah's Witnesses present the affirmative guarantee of free exercise of religion, as well as the
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deed at least one Justice, Stevens, already posits a hierarchy of
speech. The greatest protection (in content and context) is given to
speech nearest the pinnacle: political discussion and debate.
The analytic approach taken in recent speech cases appears to
conform substantially to the hierarchy model, although it has not
been formally adopted by the Supreme Court. 7 9 Most importantly
for analytic purposes, the result reached by the Court is more or
less accurately described by these models (whether they are described as a hierarchy or a codification). Nonetheless, the likelihood remains that the Court first decides the result which it thinks
is fair, and then explains that result as a consideration of the category of speech involved, the value of the particular utterances, and
the proffered state justification for punishing or proscribing the
speech. 180
b.

Hard-core Pornography: What Free Speech is Not About

Regardless of the theory applied, it is indisputable that on the
constitutional spectrum of verbal expression political discussion
occupies one extreme-only the most compelling proof of contextual danger will justify its regulation. At the other end may be
hard-core pornography. The Supreme Court will not allow hardspeech guarantee, competing against state interests in regulation. Cohen's speech was political protest. They are distinguishable from Collins and Brandenburg: if marginal, there is at
least a colorable claim to first amendment protection. Codification not only obviates the
dilemma of protecting marginal speech. It also increases protection to constitutionally valuable speech; that which is deemed dangerous or worthless can more easily be identified.
Since this conclusion is made in terms of the narrow category within which the speech falls,
the elements (danger, worthlessness) are less likely to be diluted. Id. at 315. See also J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DImusT 115-16 (1980); Schauer, supra note 126 at 908.
179. In New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982), Justice Stevens expressed his view
that the decision in effect adopted his approach, since the statute prohibited some protected
activity, as well as the unprotected. Because the basis for the Court's decision was that the
evils to be restricted overwhelmingly outweighed the expressive interest, if any, id. at 3358,
Justice Stevens indicated that child pornography involved belonged where the Court put it,
"in its rightful place near the bottom" of the speech hierarchy. Id. at 3367 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
180. For example, the Court has protected "speech that matters." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). Likewise, in Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49 (1973), Chief Justice Burger identified legitimate state interests as "stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity . . . [,] the interests of the public in the quality of life and the
total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly,
the public safety itself[,] . . . [a] right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent
society." Id. at 57-60. The Court then balanced these interests against the content of the
communication and any privacy interests implicated. See also Garvey, supra note 127, at
364 (as to children, state's interest in teaching "its future citizens" things other than racial
bigotry may outweight free-speech right).
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core pornographic speech past the doors of the home, where the
greatest privacy interest remains virtually inviolate.' 8 ' With that
sole contextual exception, hard-core pornography is not considered
speech for first amendment purposes,"" and is therefore subject to
regulation purely on content alone. Indeed, the reasoning which
underlies the Court's exclusion of this category from first amendment protection serves to clarify the meaning of constitutional
speech (as distinct from the popular perception of speech) and appears to fit well within the codification theory.
Despite the free-speech clause of the Bill or Rights, obscenity
may be abridged by governmental action because in essence it is a
physical stimulus cast in the form of verbal expression. 8 3 Likewise,
hard-core pornography is not talk about sex but a sexual surrogate,
intended to evoke sexual stimulation or gratification.' 8 It possesses so few of the mental attributes characteristic of the intellectual/emotional/communicative process which the constitutional interest in speech protects, that the first amendment is simply
inapplicable. 8 5 The particular interaction of speaker/publisher
with listener/viewer is not the process which the speech clause was
designed to enhance.' 86
Those who wish to assert their right to be able to choose for
themselves what they see-people who, for example, enjoy erotica-may pursue other legal theories such as the right to privacy.
In short, the *first amendment does not protect every conceivable
use of language (nor every form of self-expression), but only the
"communication of ideas" in the broad sense of self-expression directed toward the intellectual/emotional faculties.'8 7 Advocacy of
sex is within the purview of the first amendment; sex itself, by act
or verbal surrogate, is not. Advocacy of revolution is protected
speech; acts of revolution are not.'
The fact that every action
181. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
182. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
183. This analysis is based on Schauer, supra note 128.
184. Id. at 922.
185. Id. at 923.
186. Id. at 918-19. Since Schauer rejects individualism as the basic free speech value,
he posits that there must be "some particular value in what is conveyed" in order to justify
protecting it under the First Amendment. Id. at 919. Logically, he concludes, "[i]f there is a
category of utterance that, as a whole, has no value in the context of the justifications underlying the first amendment, and if this category can be adequately identified, then such a
category ought not to be within the scope of the first amendment." Id.
187. Schauer, supra note 126, at 923-27. See also Finnis, supra note 131, at 237-39.
188. See Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959)
(first amendment "protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be
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may carry with it an implied advocacy does not bring all conduct
within the scope of free speech."' 9
By this analysis, the seemingly arbitrary line drawn around the
first amendment in the older cases need not be arbitrary at all. e0
Where there is no "exposition of ideas" or "communication of
opinion,"19 1 there is no reason why the speech itself-simply because an epithet was thrown instead of a punch, or a movie viewed
instead of a live sex show-must be tolerated as a matter of constitutional law. 92
Because it so clearly typifies nonspeech, hard-core pornography
offers a control against which other forms of verbal expression may
be constitutionally compared. Arguably, the intent behind libel is
verbal assault upon the victim, but the Court has recognized that
discussion of public issues may be implicated where a public figure
is the target.193 A finding of actual malice brings libel into the
physical end of the expressive spectrum. Under a codification approach to the first amendment, private libel could be clearly categorized as nonspeech; the remedy available to an aggrieved plaintiff would be through the law of tort.
C.

The Untested Category: Group Libel

Group libel is a category of speech which has seldom been tested
at the Supreme Court level.lH The last time a group libel statute
proper"). By this act/advocacy distinction, Malcolm X could not be punished for saying,
"You've got to confront the white man .. with something in your hand. And I don't mean
a banana."
189. Schauer, supra note 126, at 925.
190. Professor Schauer says that "the court's decision to exclude obscenity from the
scope of the First Amendment is not a linguistic sleight-of-hand." Schauer, supra note 126,
at 910. See also Finnis, supra note 131, at 227. But see DORSEN & BENDER, supra note 115,
at 570 ("a constitutional oddity"); Haiman, supra note 132, at 127; Krallenmaker & Powell,
supra note 156, at 1201.
191. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
192. The decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), proves the rule. Though
the language on Cohen's jacket was vulgar, it could be viewed as an essential part of the
political message of opposition to the Vietnam War and, accordingly, protected speech. See
also DORSEN & BENDER, supra note 115, at 626 ("Offensiveness may also be deemed to be
more often related to political expression than is eroticism"). But see Haiman, supra note
132, at 856.
193. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
194. The Skokie case was not a true test since, as pointed out earlier, the legal basis
for the town's position was context-not content--based restriction of the Nazis' speech.
Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Skokie does not constitute a
decision on the merits, and has no formal precedential value. Darr v. Burfoed, 339 U.S. 200,
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came before the Court was in 1952, in Beauharnais v. Illinois.'"
The case involved prosecution of a white supremacist under a state
law prohibiting any publication which exposed citizens to the
traditional injuries of defamation (contempt, derision, obloquy) by
casting aspersions on their race, color, creed, or religion.19 6 Against
challenges that the statute violated the free speech and due process guarantees of the first and fourteenth amendments, and was
overly vague, the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality by a
five to four split.
For analytic purposes, the dissents in Beauharnais remain as
significant as Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority. Justice Reed assumed the power of the state to pass group libel laws,
dissenting on the grounds that the statute in question was too
vague. 197 Justice Jackson agreed that group libel laws would be
within the power of the states (though not the federal government),"' he dissented because the trial judge had offered the defendant no opportunity to prove a defense (fair comment, truth,
privilege), " and because there had been no showing of a clear and
present danger. 00 Justice Douglas suggested that defamatory conduct "directed at a race or group in this country could be made an
indictable offense," since "[1]ike picketing, it would be free speech
plus,"20 1 although he would require either a conspiracy or clear and

present danger to support an indictment.20 2 Only Justice Black
considered the defendant's activity-as petitioning for a redress of
grievances, a discussion of public issues, and merely the expression

226 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
195. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
196. The statute read:
It shall be unlawful.. . to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish,
present or exhibit in any public place in this state [any publication] which. . . portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any
race, color, creed, or religion which . . . exposes the citizens . . . to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots ....
Id. at 251, citing ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, Div. 1, § 471 (1949). Cf. the Swedish statute, supra
note 76 and accompanying text. Other states have attempted similar statutes with varying
success. See, e.g., House Bill 1018 (Crimes and Punishments-Group Defamation), State of
Maryland (1982), the constitutionality of which was challenged at 67 Op. Att'y Gen. Md.
(March 18, 1982). See also infra notes 207-232 and accompanying test.
197. 343 U.S. at 277-84.
198. Id. at 287-95.
199. Id. at 295-301.
200. Id. at 302-05.
201. Id. at 284 ("Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which
was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and obloquy".).
202. Id. at 285.
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of views favoring segregation-to be fully protected by the first
03
2

amendment.
Eight of the nine justices, therefore, indicated that group libel

laws could constitutionally be enacted. Although the law means
whatever the Court sitting at any given time says it means, there
are sound reasons to believe that a properly drafted statute
prohibiting defamation of a group on the basis of race, color, or
ethnic group would pass constitutional muster.20 First, Beauharnais has never been overruled; 05 to the contrary, it continues to be
cited by the Court with favor. Second, the Chaplinsky conceptual
framework on which Beauharnais was grounded continues to be
the starting point for first amendment analysis.2 6 Third, it can
well be argued that racial defamation is a form of verbal utterance
that is either constitutionally nonspeech (akin to hardcore pornography) or, like child pornography, so near the bottom of the hierarchy of protection as to justify state proscription and/or civil
liability.
203. Id. at 267-75.
204. Joseph Tanenhaus devotes a major portion of his article, Group Libel, 35 CoRNELL L. Rxv. 261 (1950), to the form and substance a constitutional group libel statute
should take. He examines critically various state and municipal laws,together with any judicial reaction (though failure to utilize the laws in most cases resulted in an absence of interpretation). Several conclusions emerge: (1) there must be well-defined or accustomed usage
in order to save a statute from being struck down as overly vague; (2) the proscribed content
must be clearly defined so that protected speech would not be swept within the ambit of the
statute; (3) the proscribed content must correspond to the justification by which it is outside
of the first amendment protection. Tanenhaus concludes that in the United States, the
closer a group defamation statute comes to the traditional law of defamation, the greater its
chances of being upheld. Id. at 281. In fact, Beauharnaiswas upheld on precisely those
grounds. Justice Frankfurter surveys the law of libel in an extensive footnote, including the
minor variations in different jurisdictions by statute, at common law and under the RESTATEmENT OF TORTS. 343 U.S. at 255-57 n.4. He then concludes that criminal libel "has
been defined, limited, and constitutionally recognized time out of mind." Id. at 258, 264.
Justice Frankfurter also noted that "the rubric 'race, color, creed or religion' has attained
[a] fixed meaning." Id. at 263 n.18. See also Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 698 (N.D. Ill.
1978). Compare Sweden's anti-defamation law, supra notes 74-76, and England's, found in
1965 ch. 73, Race Relations Act, section 6 (prohibiting threatening, abusive, or insulting
words intended and likely to stir up racial hatred). See generally SCHAUBR, supra note 146,
at 154-66, "The Requirements Of A Strictly Drawn Statute" (discussing overbreadth and
vagueness); SHAPmo, supra note 114, at 140-143 (discussing least means, narrowly drawn
statutes, vagueness, reasonableness).
205. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the dissent by Justice Douglas expressly urged that Beauharnais be overruled as "a misfit in our constitutional system." Id.
at 82 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
206. The areas of speech in Chaplinsky which have been taken into the first amendment (offensive speech, libel of public officials and figures) are clearly distinguishable from
defamation of a racial group.
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1. Beauharnais: Still Good Law
Over the years Beauharnaishas been cited in support of a variety of propositions, including the right of a group to make assertions on behalf of its members;20 7 the importance of narrow construction in a statute which might otherwise be impermissibly
vague or overbroad; 20"the equal stringency of the Bill of Rights in
the scope of its guarantees against the states and the federal government; 209 and the validity of social studies as evidence, even
though they may not be absolutely conclusive or scientifically irrefutable.210 Each of those propositions is useful in buttressing the
argument that prohibition or punishment of racial defamation is
constitutional. The importance of Beauharnais,however, rests in
its holding that libel is not protected by the first amendment's
guarantee of free speech.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion addressed the issue directly:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words. . . . It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. 11

Neither, Justice Frankfurter went on, were the due process or liberty clauses of the 14th amendment violated. Simply put, defamation may be punished.
Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected
speech, it is unnecessary. . . to consider the issues behind the phrase "clear
and present danger." Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech,
for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances.
Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class.'

Beauharnaisthus clearly stands for the proposition that libel is
nonspeech. The language of the Court on this point continues to be
207. Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1,
184 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
208. Gottschalk v. Alaska, 575 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1978).
209. E.g., First Nat'l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.16 (1978); Gibson
v. Florida Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 560 n.2 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
210. E.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
211. 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952).
212. Id. at 266.

112

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:77

quoted with favor."l ' Those who question the vitality of Beauharnais appear to be analytically myopic. Apropos is Mark Twain's
comment upon reading news of his own death: "The reports...
are greatly exaggerated."

214

Critics of Beauharnaishave suggested that its holding as to libel
and the first amendment was overruled by New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan21 5 But that interpretation reads Sullivan-which was expressly limited to actions brought by public officials against critics
of their official conduct 216-much too broadly. Sullivan did not say
that no category of speech could be given "talismanic immunity"
from the first amendment,21 7 but rather the Court was simply
holding that a state could not remove speech from judicial scrutiny
merely by the label put on it2" The Court has, without exception,
ruled that obscene speech is not protected,21 e but (under Sullivan)
it insists on looking behind the label to satisfy itself that the expression at issue is truly constitutional nonspeech.
If only the negative implications of Sullivan were available for
support, the continued vitality of Beauharnais as to "libelous utterances" might indeed be weak. But the case for the nonspeech
nature of private libel is strengthened by the Supreme Court's continuing reliance upon Beauharnais.In several landmark obscenity
decisions, notably Roth v. United States220 and New York v. Ferber,221 Beauharnais is cited to support the proposition that libel is
not constitutionally protected. In Ferber, the Sullivan holding is
213. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); State v. John
W., 418 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1980).
214. Cable from Mark Twain in London to the Associated Press (1897), reprintedin
J. BARTLrrr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 625 (15th ed. 1980).
215. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 173, 174
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); United States
v. Handler, 383 F.Supp. 1267, 1277 n.22 (D. Md. 1974); Garvey, supra note 127, at 362;
Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 156, at 1199 n.435; Note, "Offensive Speech", supra note
115, at 836-39. See also 67 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. (Mar. 18, 1982).
216. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
217. Id. at 269.
218. Finnis, supra note 131, at 238 n.101.
219. Nor is insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace,
obscenity, or solicitation of legal business protected. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 276
U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
220. 354 US. 476 (1957) (utterly without redeeming social value). See also Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value).
221. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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expressly characterized as an exception to the Beauharnaisrule. 222
If the Court had wanted merely to validate the idea that certain
words are nonspeech, it could have cited Chaplinsky. By pointing
to Beauharnais,centering as it did on a group libel law enacted to
address the public threat posed by racial bigotry,223 the Supreme
Court appears to have gone further. A strong argument is indicated
that the Court would approve a properly drawn and construed
statute or a judicial ruling proscribing racial defamation of a
2

group.

24

Justice Frankfurter summarily dismissed the argument that a
clear and present danger must be proven before a speaker can be
punished or restrained. 25 Only certain kinds of speech (e.g., political opinion) are fully protected-that is, subject only to the state's
fundamental interest in public order. Where speech is less protected, the state's interest may extend to some other type of harm:
decency, 2 6 reputation, 22 psychological injury,2 2 8 among others,
may constitute "substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. '2 2 9 Ferber uses Beauharnaisto illustrate the unprotected nature of libel,23 0 and goes on to suggest a "codifying" approach toward content regulation where, "within the confines of the given
classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs
222. Id. at 763.
223. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258-63 (1952).
224. The Illinois statute in Beauharnais included defamation of religious groups as
well as racial or ethnic groups within its prohibition. This article would limit the reach of
group libel to racial or ethnic defamation. (England's Race Relations Act is an example of a
narrower statute, which includes color, race, ethnic, or national origins.) Ch. 13, Sec. 6. Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, General Assembly Resolution 2106 A (XX) (December 21, 1965) set forth at greater
length forbidden group classifications (race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin). The
authors in HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 43, indicate that, while
anti-Semitism is not mentioned, it could fit within this broad definition; they note that antiSemitism has been couched in religious, racial, economic, or cultural terms. While not explicitly mentioned, the broad definition of article 1 clearly includes anti-Semitism in
whatever guise it might assume. Id. at 588-590. Religious bigotry has also been a source of
social strife and individual injury; however, to include religious defamation would open the
courts to what could arguably be excessive entanglement with the free exercise of religion a separate, affirmative guarantee of the first amendment. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1952). Racial or ethnic defamation, when cast in the form of
religious speech, can be regulated on racial/ethnic grounds. Genuine religious disagreement
thus remains protected by both the speech and free exercise clauses.
225. See supra text accompanying note 222.
226. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
227. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
228. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
229. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
230. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 763 (1982).
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the expressive interests, if any, at stake."" 1 Ferber itself, involving
speech not necessarily obscene, upheld its prohibition.
Even if Ferberdid not explicitly classify group libel as constitutional nonspeech, the content of group-targeted racial defamation
may nonetheless be a sufficient basis for state regulation. Thus, in
the Skokie-type situation, a finding of imminent public violence
should not be required to sustain a group libel law."2
The constitutionality of laws proscribing group defamation by
race or ethnic group appears to hinge on the response of courts to
several fundamental questions. First, is the deleterious effect of racism so substantively evil as to justify state action to prevent or
counteract it? Second, even if there is such a compelling state interest, does the evil persist where whole groups, not individual persons, are defamed? And third, is group libel properly characterized
as speech, somewhere within the hierarchy of first amendment protection, or can it be classified as totally unprotected "nonspeech"?
2. Racism: "The Evil to be Restricted"
Throughout American-and world-history, racism has fostered
the occasion for strife, violence, and misunderstanding.3 In its institutionalized form of slavery, racism underlay the major political
crisis of the United States, the Civil War. As anti-semitism, it nurtured the single most terrifying episode of the twentieth century-the Holocaust of Nazi Germany. It has been used to justify
the genocide of Armenians in Turkey and Eritreans in Ethiopia.
Racism has been called America's "intractable,"' " 4 most "baffling ' problem. Is it so much the way of all flesh that combatting
231. Id. at 763-64.
232. See also Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976). To
analogize the dictum in Young: few would march sons and daughters off to war to preserve
the citizen's right to utter threatening, abusive, or insulting words, inciting hatred against
the racial or ethnic group of our choice. See supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
233. See P. USTINOV, My RuSSIA 163 (1983); Bixby, The Roosevelt Court: Democratic
Ideology and Minority Rights, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 755 (1981); KERNER COMMISSION, NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CiviL DISORDERS 91 (1968); Brown, Racialism and the Rights of Nations, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 1 (1945).
234. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952).
235. Bixby, supra note 233. See also SHAPIRO, supra note 114 at 137 ("the colored
problem is the most complicated and baffling of all our social problems"). Shapiro writes:
[T]he racial question is the one issue in American life that has at various times
proved unamenable to the normal workings of the political process ... to become a
conflict of principle. Conflicts of principle are, of course, the one sort of conflict that a
liberal democracy, whose life is compromise, cannot tolerate, for it is possible to compromise interests but not principles.
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it amounts to little more than a waste of social energy?

History itself demonstrates that racism is not unassailable.8

6

Racially rooted problems can be dealt with through the law, as was
cogently illustrated by Arthur Larson in a 1969 law review article.' 37 The two extreme views-that the law is useless to change
attitudes, and that any gain achieved is negligible-are simply contradicted by hard evidence.23 8 Law in its legislative or judicial
forms may be ineffective where overt racism is widespread and
deeply rooted, 3 9 but blatant prejudice has become somewhat
anachronistic, ' 40 at least in the United States.
In the international community as well, "man's most dangerous
myth"' has been increasingly discredited. In 1959, following a
rash of racist incidents in Europe and South America,' 4 the
United Nations adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination." 3 "[A]ny doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority," read the statement, "is scientifically
false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and
. . .there is no justification for racial discrimination, either in theory or in practice."' 2 4 Not only is racism said to deny human rights

and offend human dignity, it constitutes "an obstacle to friendly
and peaceful relations among nations and as a fact capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples."" 4 5 In times of hardship
Id.
236. See generally McDoUGLAS & CHEN,supra note 43, at 602.
237. Larson, The New Law Of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 470. Professor Larson was, ofcourse, speaking of white-black relations specifically. The principles underlying
his arguments are equally applicable to other forms of racism. See also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261-62 (1952); Oberg, Is Sweden Ripe For Racism?, 27 SOCIAL CHANGE IN
SwnEN 6 (Feb. 1983) (law and attitude-changing going together).
238. Larson, supra note 237, at 511.
239. Id. at 514. His specific example was the failure of prohibition.
240. Id. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983); "Town
Seeks Reason For Synagogue Burnings," Baltimore Sun, Oct. 3, 1983, Al, col. 5-6, at A12,
col4.
241. McDouoAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at 569. The source of the quotation is A.
MONTAGU, MAN'S MosT DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (1974): "The popular categorizations of 'race ... when indulging in "man's most dangerous myth," are built upon
vague, shifting, and erratic references.'"
242. Id. at 585-86.
243. Adopted November 20, 1963 by the General Assembly of the United Nations (resolution 1904 (XVIII)). The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination was adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General
Assembly resolution 2106A (XX), December 21, 1965.
244. U.N. DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
PREAMBLE.

245. Id. at art. 1.
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or stress, outbreaks of racial hatred and violence become an expression of frustrated anger, feeding upon itself in a vicious cycle. 246 The victimized group is identified by the attacker according
to its race and conveniently made the scapegoat, in what has been
called "an economy of thought.

214 7

(Little if any intellect is neces-

sary to hurl racial epithets, paint a swastika, burn a cross, or blame
a minority group for specific problems.) 248 A "free and robust exchange of ideas 2 49 is nonexistent; and there is a total absence of

debate by which each individual can make up his own mind, on the
basis of all the evidence on every political-moral issue. 250 Racial

defamation short-circuits the democratic principle of self-government.2 5 1 By threatening this basic presupposition, it becomes a

substantive evil not only to those persons directly targeted, but to
all society.
3. The Interrelationship of Groups and Individuals: Interest
and Injury
An intimate nexus exists between individuals and the groups or
associations to which they belong. Procedurally, associations may
assert the rights of their members. 2 At least one court, relying on
the rationale accepted in Beauharnais, has held that individual
246. See, e.g., G. ALLPORT, The Nature of Prejudice (1954), in BELL, supra note 144,
at 85; ROWAN AND MAZmL, Can The Klan Come Back?, 123 READER'S DIGEST 197 (Sept.
1983); Hard Times Trigger Racial, Religious Hate, 11 HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (1983).
247. Id.
248. Seymour Lipset suggested in The Sources of the Radical Right, in D. BELL, THE
RADIcAL RIGHT 289 (1963), that after World War II, anti-communist crusades became the
vehicle for hostilities formerly directed against Jews; anti-Semitism fell into disrepute, but
McCarthyism was riding high. Lipset's theory was correct, and once McCarthyism declined,
racism and its anti-semitic variant again became the easy outlet, "white [Gentile]
supremacy, cloaked in patriotism and religion." ROWAN AND MAzn., supra note 246, at 203.
249. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973).
250. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1135 (1979).
251. The danger to "ordered liberty" is not merely violent disruption of public order.
As Professor Riesman noted, discussing Nazi Germany, the leaders utilized a more insidious
approach, but one no less dangerous to democratic pluralism than overt violence, since they
"aim[ed] at political and economic annihilation of groups ... and use[d] violence only incidentally." Riesman, supra note 155, at 753. Both Justice Douglas, dissenting in Beauharnais, and Professor Shapiro, discussing the future of the first amendment, seem not to have
considered this subtle danger, equating it simply with overtly violent conspiracy or action:
"something close to a new civil war." SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 158. Similarly, the F.C.C.
in 1972 refused to ban the continued broadcasting of a white supremist candidate for the
U.S. Senate, saying that it did not rise "above the level of public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest," and that no clear and present danger was posed. See infra test accompanying
note 318.
252. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

Group Libel

1984

Black citizens could be injured through the defendant's libelous
characterization of the Negro race. " Most courts, however, have
been unable, or unwilling, to depart from the traditional theory
that redress is available only where an individual has been injured-or to recognize that defamation of a group directly injures
its members.
It has been suggested that libel is more important in America
than in other Western democracies because an individual's reputation is considered akin to a property interest.2 " Similarly, the role
of the group in the American social process has been subordinated
to the role of the individual. 5
Nevertheless, America remains a great melting pot, with perhaps
greater diversity of ethnic representation than any other place in
the world. It has almost literally torn itself apart to effect racial
integration. When destructive attack on a group is permitted, individuals within the ranks inescapably suffer. 2 " Where Jews or
Blacks are defamed as a group, the speaker's target is each Jew or
each Black. The same is true with any other racial or ethnic denomination. When a neo-Nazi bemoans the fact that Hitler "didn't
finish the job (of exterminating Jews)," he is not likely to turn to a
Jewish person and say, "Of course, I didn't mean to include
7
you.

' '25

As libel law has traditionally focused on the individual, psychiatrists have been concerned primarily with the pathology of individual paranoia. It has been suggested, however, that one type of
paranoia is the projection by one group upon another of its own
low self-esteem. 258 In light of the conflicts, misunderstandings, acts
253.

Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board,

367 U.S. 1 (1961).
254. Riesman, supra note 155, at 731.
255. Id. The super-technical approach (legalistic in the worse sense) to the injurious
effect of group defamation is illustrated by Rockwell v. Morris, where the New York Jewish
War Veterans was stricken as intervenor-appellant, on the grounds that it "was not a party
aggrieved" by Rockwell's Nazi harangues. 12 A.D.2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 38, aff'd, 10
N.Y.2d 721, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 268 (1961).
256. See Nimmer, supra note 168, at 949-50; Riesman, supra note 155, at 731;
Tanenhaus, supra note 204, at 261.
257. Professor Riesman appears to be more preoccupied with the form of the statement than itssubstance, when he ponders whether "virulent attacks are actually libelous or
slanderous." The example he then refers to, "If I had my way... I would hang all the Jews
in this country," seems clearly to be racially defamatory. It should not be necessary for
racial defamation to take some particular form, such as an accusatory slur or epithet. Riesman, supra note 155, at 751 (quoting People v. Ninfo, City Magistrate's Court, 7th District,
Borough of Manhattan, Sep. 20, 1939, Stenographer's Minutes at 9-10).
258. Pinderhughes, UnderstandingBlack Power: Processes and Proposals, 125 Am.J.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:77

of violence, and "deaths on a massive scale" which group-paranoid
processes have caused, "psychiatrists may come to identify them as
the most serious pathogenic factors in our era." ' 9 In short, injury
to the self, between individuals, and among groups is inflicted by
the paranoia from which racism springs, and of which racial defamation is one expression.
Private victims of defamation are more entitled to redress for
their injuries than public figures, because they have not chosen to
lead a public life or speak out on public issues so as to make themselves a target for attack.2 60 In addition, a private person's capacity

for self-help is more limited.261 Persons targeted by reason of their
racial or ethnic identity are in the same position: they have not
chosen their ancestry, which the speaker treats less as an objective
fact than a subjective source of disparagement. 62 Individuals
within the group are all the more vulnerable to the defamatory
speech.'5
Older cases suggested that the very breadth of the libel (casting
aspersion wholesale, upon a large population of diverse individuPSYCHIATRY 1552-57 (1969), in BELL, supra note 144, at 89-91.

259. Id.
260. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
261. Id. See also Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308, 328 (1979).
262. See A. Downs, Racism in America and How To Combat It, U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights 5-6 (1980), in BELL, supra note 144, at 87-88 (defining racism as a form of behavior
not subordinating a person or group, because of "color" not a scientific idea). Downs points
out that the "color" judgment may be made by a white racist, for example, even where the
"other" group is technically white (e.g., Mexican-Americans). Similarly, Allport describes
the process. "An imaginative person can twist the concept of race in almost any way he
wishes, and cause it to configurate and 'explain' his prejudices." ALLPORT, supra note 246, at
85. See also McDoUoAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at 569 ("a race is any group of people whom
they choose to describe as a race") (quoting A. MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON RACR 8 (1972)).
NmzR, supra note 80, at 17, indicates that in the bitter in-fighting among the various neoNazi groups, Frank Collins was accused by rivals of having Jewish blood.
263. Neier also indicates that in Naxi Germany, those persons of Jewish background
who had converted to Christianity nevertheless were classified as Jews. The label was applied for the benefit and purposes of the attackers, rather than to reflect any scientific or
objective fact. Nma, supra note 80, at 26. See also McDouGAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at
580. Of course, the concept of race itself is at best amorphous since "[riaces change, die,
merge with other races, become modified by racial intermarriage .... [R]ace is manifestly
a transitory fact." Brown, supra note 233, at 11. Recently, a Louisiana woman challenged
her racial classification, under a state statute which labelled her legally "colored" on the
basis of 1/32 Negro ancestry. The obviously fallacious nature of such a racial classification
system resulted in the repeal of the law. Smart-Grosvenor, Observed With "Racial Purity",
Ms. 28-30 (June 1983); Editor's Note, Ms. 12 (September 1983). In some families where
negroid and caucasian genetic characteristics are present, there may be children who look
"black," and others "white." The apparently "white" children then may make an aff-mative
self-identification of themselves as black (but probably not, vice versa.) Conversation with
D. Bruce Hanson, Center For Community Change, Wash., D.C. (August 27, 1983).
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als) would undercut the charges.'" This approach presupposes a
more rational response by the speaker's audience than experience
with racial defamation warrants.2 6 ' It also fails to take seriously
the destructive nature of racism upon civilized society.'" Whether
particular racial characterizations could be "proven true" is a
2 e7
straw issue which often plays into the hands of the defamer.
When an extreme right-wing group accuses someone of being a
"communist," for example, his denial alone is not a complete cure
for the injury to his reputation. A Black may be in a worse position
when subjected to the slander, "niggers are rapists"-or even to
the milder proposition, "Blacks are genetically inferior." Against
26
the group smear, which inevitably has some partial factual basis 8
(some Blacks are convicted rapists, some have low I.Q.'s), the
statement's deleterious effect is not so easily remedied. The "intractable problem" of racism is made more so.
The traditional arguments against the constitutionality of group
libel laws-that there is no injury because no individual is directly
264. Riesman, supra note 155, at 770. In People v. Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257,
(1938); the court opined that the law need not be stretched to protect against group libel.
Abuse of freedom of speech would be effectively restrained by speakers' good taste-or, that
failing, by awareness that defamatory attacks are self-defeating. Id. at 259. One wonders at
what distance from reality this judge lived. See also Tanenhaus, supra note 204, 266-273
(discussing old English and American criminal libel cases involving Jews, civil war veterans,
Knights of Columbus); Note, Defamation of A Group, 21 NOTRE DAME LAw. 21, 22 (1945).
265. See ALLPORT, supra note 246, at 85. See generally Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 COL. L. Rxv. 1085 (1942) (discussing use of
libel and slander by fascists). See infra note 316. Judicial tolerance of racial defamation,
demonstrated in, e.g., People v. Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268-69 (1938) ("It is wiser to
bear with this sort of scandal-mongering. .. We must suffer the demagogue and the charlatan, in order to make certain that we do not limit or restrain the honest commentator on
public affairs") reflects a persistent allegiance to the marketplace of ideas. The hard case of
racism, especially in its extreme form (Hitler's genocidal practices), is, however, an invariable part of marketplace discussions. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 126, at 915-16 (Slavery
was not a wise policy, Nazism was not correct); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88
YALE L.J. 1105, 1132 (1979). Since the deleterious effects of group-directed racism are abundantly evident, the judicial conclusion that racial defamation of groups inflicts no harm
which reasoned reflection will not cure seems illogical at best. See Nimmer, supra note 168,
at 955, 933.
266. Lipset, supra note 248, at 298 also indicates the long-term effect that even an
episodic wave of hate-mongering can have on the social fabric. His illustration is the restrictive immigration laws passed in the early 20th century.
267. Riesman, supra note 265, at 1089-1101 (describing European experience).
268. See Tanenhaus, supra note 204, at 293. Tanenhaus concludes that the problem of
"proof" is a major stumbling block to the enforcement of group libel law. But the judiciary
is clearly capable of drawing the necessarily fine lines involved in speech claims, so the first
amendment is not merely "an unlimited license to talk." Kongisberg v. State Bar of Cal.,
366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961). Courts should be able to address relativity and partial truth in group
libel, as they do for individuals.
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defamed, and that society is somehow stronger for permitting selfexpression through the intentional infliction of injurious racial attackse-are unpersuasive in the light of history, social science,
and common sense. The issue is really whether the law is ready to
recognize the nature and extent of the harmful effect1 7 0-and the
courts to accept group libel as an analytically sound basis for
2 71
liability.
4. Racial Defamation as Speech
The courts have not been oblivious to the patently offensive nature of racial defamation, in that they are quick to repudiate the
27
But such repudiation is generally in
message of the speakersY.
apology for their judgment that the speech is protected by the first
amendment. Justice Black interprets the white supremacist literature in Beauharnais as essentially the expression of political
ideas. 27 8 Various commentators have taken the same approach.
One, for example, says that Nazi speech (referring specifically to
the Skokie situation) is political in nature,27 4 and as such warrants
269. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286-87 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545-46 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); People v.
Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1938); DOUGLAS, supra note 124, at 363; DORSEN & BENDER,
supra note 115, at 570; Garvey, supra note 127, at 363; Wellington, supra note 265, at 113134; Note, supra note 115, at 854 (discussed from the perspective of radical black speech);
Note, Constitutional Law-Free Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 489,
498 (1951).
270. See Burkey, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1971) in Bell, supra note 144, at 100-101; McDouGAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at 581-83;
Tanenhaus, supra note 204, at 278.
271. Riesman, supra note 155, at 772. Professor Riesman recognized the speculative
nature of damages in group libel, suggesting that the appropriate relief might be an action
in equity for an injunction. Id. at 771-73. See also Tanenhaus, supra note 204, at 290-91
(discussing procedural aspects). In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), Justice
Frankfurther indicated that whether or-not racial defamation laws would solve the underlying problems, states should be permitted to deal with them through "the trial-and-error
inherent in . . . efforts to deal with obstinate social issues." Id. at 262.
272. E.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (Skelley-Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Rockwell v. Morris,
12 A.D.2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215
N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.S.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 913 (1961).
273. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 270 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
274. Schauer, supra note 126, at 919. In his later article, Codifying the First Amendment, Schauer seemed to modify this position suggesting that Collins' speech was not protected for its own sake-as political speech-but only as a "fortunate beneficiary" of the
courts' desire to protect the board category of political speech. Schauer, supra note 147, at
286-87. Under the broad-category approach to the speech clause, the marginal speech must
be protected to ensure that genuine political speech is not abridged. Under the narrow cate-
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the highest degree of first amendment protection. Another, referring to the speakers as "extreme rightwing neo-fascists," nevertheless reminds
his readers that "political dissent must not be
7 5
stifled."1
Other expressions of racial and ethnic bigotry are variously described as ideas, views, or doctrines. Though not expressly labelled
political speech, they are treated as contributions to the democratic marketplace-where, for first amendment purposes, there is
said to be "no such thing as a false idea. ''27 6 "Government cannot

protect the public against false doctrine," wrote Justice Jackson in
Thomas v. Collins.27 7 "Each must be his own watchman for truth
. . . [since] our forefathers did not trust government to separate
27 8
A state court once ruled that the
truth from falsehood for us."1

speeches of George Lincoln Rockwell, former leader of the American Nazi Party, could not be abridged because if they were, "the
preacher of any strange doctrine could be stopped.

' 27 9

Another of-

fered the noble-sounding opinion that "[w]e must suffer the demain order to safeguard the honest commentator
gogue and charlatan,
2' 80
on public affairs.
Racial defamation is shielded by the first amendment, the argument goes, for the same reasons that other abhorrent speech is
protected: first, because an opinion (not necessarily the "truth")28 is
1
best arrived at in the free exchange of discussion and persuasion;
gorization of speech under a first amendment umbrella of values, the implication is that
such "beneficiaries" would lose their free ride.
275.

SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 136.

276. Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press,54 TEx. L. REv. 1221, 1245 (1976)
(quoting Justice Power in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)). This is
the basis for Justice Douglas' dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. at 284-87 (1952).
See also Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(Skelley-Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969) (speech approaches the
area of political and social commentary). The speech was anti-Zionist, but did not attack
Jews as a religious group. Under the facts, Chief Justice Burger (then Circuit Judge) held in
the opinion that the appeals to reason and to prejudice were impossible to separate. Id. at
172. See infra note 321 for additional discussion of this case.
277.

323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).

278. Id. at 545-46.
279. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 276, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29, appeal dismissed, 9
N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, affd, 10 N.Y.S.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219
N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
280. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268 (1938).
281. E.g., Garvey, supra note 127, at 361 (value of student free speech in the search
for truth is training for adult participation). Professor Shapiro more realistically identifies
the outcome of the marketplace model as "the tentative conviction that there is no absolute
truth," and its corollary, that "adjustment between rival partial truths is better.., than
adherence to one fixed mixture of truth and falsehood." SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 53;

122
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and second, because the risk to democracy from any form of "prescreening" far outweighs the benefit of not having to deal with unpopular, alarming, obnoxious, or shocking ideas.282 It is thus political prudence, not political philosophy, which underlies the freedom
for this type of speech.2"'
In so categorizing racial defamation as speech, however, the
courts are misconstruing its form for its substance. Superficially,
racists claim to be merely expressing legitimate thoughts on the
relations between social groups, urban problems, politics, or
finance-all under the cloak of patriotism.2 84 Racial defamation
often looks like political speech.28 One need scratch barely beneath the surface, though, to recognize that racial defamation offers no ideas, opinions, or proposals-nothing of substance or
merit. It may be more accurately perceived as linguistic abuse (verbal assault on an unwilling target);28 6 the kind of fascism "which
aims at political and economic annihilation of groups. . and uses
violence only incidentally";2 87 a destructive form of twisted selfexpression; 288 or, most simply, scapegoating.28 9 Just as a physical
assault is not protected self-expression, neither should the verbal
assault of racial defamation be misconstrued as protected
Schauer, supra note 126, at 915-17 (history supports proposition that population selection
among ideas, arrives at truth more readily than governmental selection); Wellington, supra
note 265, at 1134 (quest of democracy is formal justice and evolving truth); Note, supra note
269, at 498 ("society's interest in the attainment of the truth through the free exchange of
violently divergent ideas ....
").
282. E.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 124, at 363; SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 55; Kratteunaker & Powe, supra note 156, at 1213; Note, supra note 115, at 835. The adjectives are
those of the court in Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35, appeal
dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 205, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d
836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
283. SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 47.

284.

ROWAN AND MAZIL,

supra note 246, at 203.

285. See text of white racist candidate in supra note 251.
286. Riesman uses the term "verbal sadism." See supra note 265, at 1088. See also
Nimmer, supra note 168, at 949-50.
287. Riesman, supra note 155, at 753. See also Riesman, supra note 265, at 1089 (verbal attacks used in early stages of fascism, as an initial building and unifying anti-democratic tool, while the group is small and/or weak).
288. The phrase is Garvey's, supra note 127, at 365.
289. See Nimmer, supra note 168, at 949 (freedom of speech as safety valve); BELL,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 59 (1973); Riesman, supra note 155, at 731. (Arguably, the interest is stronger, since racial targets are substantively injured-by the content-whereas the
captive audience is harmed only by the use of the context, a lesser infringement.) There is
some conceptual similarity between the captive audience, supra note 115, and the unwilling
victimized group, so that protection of groups libelled racially is as significant as that of the
captive audience.
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speech.29 Just as hardcore pornography is not permitted "talismanic immunity" from judicial scrutiny, 9 neither should racism
be allowed to2 "demean the grand conception of the First

Amendment.

29

5. Racial Defamation as Nonspeech
At the very least, racial defamation is "covered but outweighed".2 98 Indeed, in Justice Stevens' hierarchy of constitutional
protection, it is mired very near the bottom.2
It is difficult to envision anything about racial defamation that
would justify its. participation in the marketplace of ideas. Citizens

would not be impoverished by the loss of a political-moral issue
about which each must "make up his own mind. 2s All the political, economic, social, and psychological issues of American life
would remain to be debated. Racial defamation can be proscribed
not as a "strange doctrine"29' 6 or a false idea, but as a form of assault, as conduct. The speech clause protects the marketplace of
ideas, not the battleground.
The Supreme Court's treatment of the religion clause of the first
amendment provides an apt analogy. 97 One is absolutely guaranteed the freedom to believe whatever one wishes, but not the right
in every case to translate belief into action. 298 The "preacher of
290. See Haiman, supra note 132, at 112 (discussing the position of Zechariah Chaffee,
Jr., that some expression is "akin to a physical blow").
291. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). Analogously, the claim
that allegedly obscene material has first amendment value (serious literary, educational, scientific, artistic worth, advocating a position, or intending to impart information) is assessed
by a reviewing court. The bare claim does not close the matter. F. SCHAUKR, THE LAW OF
OasczNrr 36-53 (1976). Of course, attempts to camouflage the nature of racial defamation
may not even be made. Handbills circulated by the Nazis prior to their planned demonstration in Skokie contained statements blatantly derogatory to Jews; some denied the Holocaust or made otherwise false representations of verifiable historical fact. Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308, 331 (1979). The white racist campaign
advertisement was similarly overt. See supra note 251.
292. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
293. Schauer, supra note 147, at 305.
294. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 781 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
295. Wellington, supra note 265, at 1135.
296. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35, appeal dismissed,
9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.S.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219
N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
297. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ."
298. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). "The first is absolute but, in
the nature of things, the second cannot be." This dual aspect was reaffirmed expressly in
School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in public

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:77

strange doctrine" e cannot be restrained from preaching, but the
practice of doctrine (strange or otherwise) may be regulated.30 0
Only in total abstraction could racist ideas be freely offered in the
democratic marketplace of speech.3 01
As discussed earlier, pornography does not "preach sex"; it offers
itself as a sexual surrogate-its purpose, to stimulate a response.830
The speech clause of the first amendment does not apply to pictorial display so minimally cognitive and essentially physical. Analogously, racial defamation does not merely "preach hate"; it is oneway hatred practiced by the speaker, who seeks to stimulate his
audience to a like response.3 03 Race is a trigger; a whole series of
schools struck down); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws
upheld).
299. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, N.Y.S.2d 25, 35, appeal dismissed, 9
N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.S.2d 268, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219
N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
300. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
301. Whether doctrinal and practical racial hatred can be distinguished is arguable.
The expression of theory of racism tends to expose the targeted group to bigotry and
prejudice. An objective discussion of the South African system of apartheid would be protected by the speech clause (as it would protect the study of the Bible as literature without
violating the Establishment Clause, School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 223-25 (1963)). Even cast in its most favorable light by the official interpretations,
apartheid is a doctrine of "separate but equal." In the United States, however, the conclusion is final: forced, imposed separation is inherently unequal. Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Where the speaker becomes an advocate for apartheid, therefore, the
impermissible line is crossed. The speech, arguably, is inherently racially defamatory. See
also Brown, supra note 233, at 3 (1945) (distinguishing the principle of unqualified racialism, from the implied racism of discriminatory and paternalistic behavior). The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, G.A. Resolution 2200A
(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), makes "all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such
acts against any race or group of person of another colour or ethnic origin" a punishable
offense. Due regard is to be given to the freedom of expression principles of article 5; nevertheless, the conclusion of the International Covenant (as of this article) is that the advocacy
of racism has no public value which, given the demonstrably harmful effects with which it is
inextricably intertwined, would support its protection. But see Wellington, supra note 265,
at 1131-33 (1979) (arguing that there is no such thing as a closed issue, including the issue of
genocide); SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 135 ("we can never be sure that any statement is
true").
302. See supra note 181-189 and accompanying text.
303. See Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 276, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29, appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d
836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), where the court acknowledged that
"[giroup hate and fear are stimulated and expressly intended to be stimulated in those ripe
for it." Applying the traditional danger test, the New York court found that Rockwell must
be given a permit to speak, as any other "preacher of any strange doctrine," unless a showing of irreversible harm could be made to cut him off. Id. This is, of course, a classic contextual analysis.
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emotionally conditioned responses follow. 30 4 The Nazi in Germany
understood perfectly the rhetorical uses of racism.30 5 Contemporary hate-groups likewise manipulate the "boogie,"s making little
pretense toward persuasion but much toward prejudice. 0 7
When the state treats racial defamation as constitutional speech
or advocacy, it distorts the relationship between government and
individuals.3 0 8 The speech clause of the first amendment is intended to protect individuals from governmental domination of
opinion (directly, or through suppression of unpopular minority
positions through tyranny of the majority). Are not individuals
who are abused by reason of their race, color, or ethnicity also entitled to protection?3 0 9 When the government fails to intervene, nonspeech has succeeded in its masquerade.3 10 Victims can rebut by
means of discussion and persuasion,3 1 1 but those are not necessa12
rily the best means to counteract nonspeech.
The proper analysis of racial defamation-as constitutional nonspeech-would fully permit its regulation by the state. In Skokie,
fears were expressed that the boundary line between protected political dissent and unprotected group defamation would be impos304. McDoUoAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at 570.
305. See, e.g., Bixby, supra note 233, at 753-60; Riesman, supra note 265, at 1085-89;
Riesman, supra note 155, passim; Riesman & Glazer, The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes, THE RAnIcAL RIGHT 97 (1963) ("In America, Jews and Negros divide between them the hostilities that spring from inner conflict.... In Europe the Jew must do
double duty.").
306. ALLPORT, supra note 246, at 85.
307. See Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 289, 211 N.Y.S.2d :25, 41-44, (Eager, J.,
dissenting), appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 1623, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10
N.Y. 2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961); Bixby,
supra note 233, at 758-59.
308. Riesman, supra note 155, at 779.
309. See SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 136, identifying, with regard to extreme rightwing neo-fascists, the problem of not stifling political dissent, while "thwarting their goal of
creating situations of intergroup hatred and violence." Id. See also DOGSSN & BENDER,
supra note 115, at 570, where the Court's treatment of obscenity is attributed, in part, to
the inherent difficulty of affirmatively proving the widespread social harms flowing from the
speech. The conclusion applies equally to defamation of racial groups: widespread effect,
"unsusceptible" of "proof." Id.
310. See Nimmer, supra note 168, at 933, 955. Too much of the argument against
racial defamation laws is bound up in rigid adherence to principle, and not enough of it
addresses the central thesis of experience.
311. There were certain positive aspects which emerged from the Skokie confrontation. Many people were reawakened to the horrors of Nazism, especially the post-war generation. The community rallied in ecumenical fashion behind the rights of the survivors and
against the Nazis. But these do not justify denial of government protection to the defamed
persons in the first place. See also N 4ER, supra note 80, at 7-8.
312. Nimmer, supra note 168, at 955.
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sible to draw, and to attempt to create one could ultimately force
democracy to give way to totalitarianism. 13 In fact, Collin's defamatory taunts were protected in the name of free speech, while the
community's interests in privacy, reputation, and social order were
allowed to suffer.
To suggest that the law cannot distinguish between political
comment and racial defamation 14 is akin to equating Michelangelo's nudes with the salacious depictions in a 42nd Street "pornography" shop. But courts undertake a rigorous scrutiny of the
facts before offering protection in obscenity and pornography
cases. 15 Subtle line-drawing is also required in free-exercise-of-religion claims. The line between racial defamation and political
comment should not be nearly so difficult.
6.

The Test

Racial defamation occurs whenever the speaker's intention-or
the perceived effect of the speech-is to cause ridicule or contempt
upon a racial group. In every case intention and effect are subjective determinations fully within a court's discretion.
For example, the following situations could give rise to a finding
of constitutionally punishable racial defamation:
* A radio talk show is discussing reparations for Japanese-Americans interned in concentration camps in the United States following the attack on
Pearl Harbor. A caller expresses disbelief at the very notion, telling the
Congressman who is sponsoring the legislation (a guest on the show), "you
obviously haven't done your homework. Do you know what those people
did? I know .

. ."a

* Prior to a planned demonstration, Nazis circulate handbills containing
statements derogatory of Jews and claiming that the Holocaust was a
317
fabrication.
* A political candidate issues the following statement: I am J.B. Stoner. I
am the only candidate for U.S. Senator who is for the white people. I am
the only candidate who is against integration. All of the other candidates
313. The Beauharnais opinion rejects this scenario. 343 U.S. 250, 263-64 (1952).
314. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268 (1938).
315. SCHAUER, supra note 146, at 156-57.
316. Comments made by a caller to the Fred Fisk Show, (Washington, D.C., Sept. 16,
1983) (emphasis added). The issue of the U.S. internment policy is, of course, valuable. It
necessarily includes exploration of the rationale put forward at the time: namely, the perceived threat of the Japanese-Americans as potential fifth column. Whether the caller's
speech constitutes genuine discussion, or mere racially based prejudice and expression of
contempt for the Japanese as a group, would be a factual matter to be determined in view of
all the circumstances.
317. See Note, supra note 261.
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are race mixers to one degree or another. I say we must repeal the civil
rights law, which takes jobs frcm us whites and gives them to the niggers.
The main reason why niggers want integration is because they want our
white women. I am for law and order with the knowledge that you cannot
have law and order and niggers too. Vote white. This time vote your convictions by voting white racist J.B. Stoner into the run-off election for U.S.
Senator.31 8

In each of those cases the court should be clearly within its discretion to determine that what underlay such sweeping indictments of Japanese-Americans, Jews, and Blacks was not history
but prejudice. In short, a judge or jury should be free to discern
(and allow punishment of) bigotry masquerading as history or political science.
And what of other "sciences"? Should William Shockley, a
Nobel Laureate, be protected from any abridgment of his right to
say that-on the basis on intelligence test scores-Blacks are genetically inferior?3 19 According to the test suggested above, not
necessarily. While the statistical results of Shockley's experiments
would be protected, a court could constitutionally decide that his
personal conclusion about racial inferiority was unwarranted. An
analogous situation would exist where a study of illegitimate births
indicated a higher percentage of babies born to single teenage
Black mothers than to single teenage whites: it could be defamatory for one to state openly that the study proved beyond doubt
that Black girls are predisposed to promiscuity simply because
they are black.
Similarly, a court would be well within constitutional bounds to
hold that the display of swastikas does not contribute significantly
to any important political discussion of fascism. 20 Although that
movement's generic symbol-the rod and bundle of arrows-bears
legitimate political connotations, the swastika was Hitler's personal
symbol as well as the insignia for the Nazis' anti-semitic ideology
of "Aryan" superiority. Its display is essential only to convey the
message that genocide is justifiable.3 21 Conversely, a court would be
318.

BELL, supra note 144, at 357.

319. See the discussion in Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308
(1979).
320. This is possibly the critical element in the argument for regulation, at least under
the authority of New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1982). If courts believe that
defamation (including symbolic speech) of a racial or ethnic group could be a likely part of
politically significant speech, they will remain unwilling to permit its regulation or
punishment.
321. A more likely modern question is where anti-Zionism fits into these issues. The
conclusion of the D.C. Circuit Court in Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403
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within its discretion to adopt a more libertarian approach-without having to invoke constitutional necessity as its
rationale. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Ferber, it will
monitor not only the broad suppression of speech, but the overprotection of verbal expression not entitled to shielding by the first
8 22
amendment.
D.

What Would Happen Elsewhere

The test proposed above is necessary only under a constitutional
form of government in which free speech is given an especially exalted jurisprudential status-that is to say, only in America. But
while the importance we accord the first amendment may reflect a
noble and commendable preoccupation with fundamental liberty,
the more restrictive approach of other "free" countries is no less
high-minded, and could well prove the wiser course.
As suggested earlier, it is not only a nation's social philosophy
which determines the degree to which it will dictate or tolerate a
system of laws, but its historical experience as well."2 ' We have
seen, for example, how Sweden limits the right of its citizens to
defame a race3 2' or to wear an unauthorized military uniform in
public. 2 5 No doubt these laws, enacted after World War II, were in
direct response to the horrors of the Holocaust. While such provisions would quickly be challenged in the United States and likely
found wanting under the Constitution, in Sweden they remain ac32 6
cepted, untested, and innocuous.
Just how personal freedoms are codified, therefore, depends
upon one's orientation. Who is to say that the American Bill of
F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969), is probably correct. The position of the ADL that anti-Zionism per se constituted an appeal to racial or religious
prejudice was not accepted by the court. In the facts, no direct expression of anti-Jewish
attack was made. The court accepted the FCC's position that it would be impractical (and
virtually impossible) to separate the appeals to reason and to prejudice. Id. at 172. But a
direct anti-Semitic appeal to prejudice would be separable. Chief Justice Burger (then Circuit Judge) reminded the FCC of its "duty to consider a patten of libelous conduct," treating it as something distinct from the merely unpopular speech anti-Zionism was found to be.

Id.
322. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Cf. supra note 265.
323. See supra notes 50-79 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
326. Author's taped interviews (in May, 1982) with Gunnar Karnell, Professor of Law
at the Stockhom School of Economics; Per-Erik Nilsson, Chief Ombudsman of Sweden;

Thorsten Cars, Swedish Press Ombudsman; and Gustaf Petren, a Justice on the Swedish
Supreme Court. See also Oberg, supra note 237.
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Rights is a better document than Sweden's Instrument of Government, or that either is ethically or practically superior to the Ten
Commandments?
It is also important to note that what a constitution guarantees a
country does not always deliver. The constitution of the Soviet
Union, for one, is utopian in scope and scruple, but becomes a Big
Lie in practice. 2 7
IV.

CONCLUSION

The proper criteria by which any personal liberty-and particularly the freedom of speech-must be measured are the degree to
which it allows an individual to impose his speech on someone else,
and the deleterious effect of that speech. If either the imposition
or deleterious effect is excessive, the liberty must be restricted. Because the effect of racial defamation can only be deleterious, the
degree of its imposition is irrelevant. It lacks any social, moral, or
constitutional value. It is less real "speech" than the verbal counterpart of a body blow to people targeted for its contempt, a rent
in the fabric of American democracy. Such an approach is entirely
consistent with the origin and development of the Bill of Rights.
We have long refused to pervert the first amendment by saying
that it shields obscene or dangerous speech. Likewise left unprotected are utterances which cause damage to an individual's reputation. But it is difficult to conceive of speech that is more damaging to a free and civilized society than racial hatred and
contempt-whether subtly undercutting human dignity or explicitly calling for the destruction of an entire race.
Other democracies-Sweden, in particular-have chosen to protect themselves and their people by banning such verbal assaults.3 28 In America, the courts have ruled that Nazis must be permitted to march in public streets-but as Justice Blackmun
29
observed, "[e]very court has had to apologize for that result.

3'

It

is time for courts to stop apologizing, and to begin properly analyzing what racial defamation is and what it is not. The legitimate
interests of its victims, who in the long run include all of us, should
not be sublimated to a blind (and in this case misplaced) principle.
327. See Soviet Constitution, Chapters 6 & 7.
328. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Not all democracies would base the
prohibition of racial defamation on legalistic or moral grounds. For example, as an Australian law professor recently told the author in a private conversation, the Nazis would likely
be prohibited from marching in the streets of Sydney "because it would be bad for tourism."
329. Smith v. Collins, 436 U.S. 916, 918 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Punishment of racial defamation has not jeopardized freedom
elsewhere. Neither would democracy suffer in America, were Nazis
prohibited from marching in Skokie.

